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REPRESSION AND WOMEN’S DISSENT: 
GENDER AND PROTESTS 
 
Why do women protest?  Why do women protest “as women”?  Why do some 
women participate in protests but not others?  In the wake of the Women’s March of 
2017, perhaps the largest single day protest event in history, these questions are 
particularly timely and deserve scholarly attention.  One important but understudied and 
undertheorized motivation for women’s protests is state sanctioned violence, particularly 
repression.  This dissertation explicitly theorizes about how state perpetration of violence, 
particularly state use of repression, both motivates and shapes women’s protests on a 
global scale.   
In this dissertation, I argue that one key motivation for women’s protest is 
repression by the state, and I theorize that women will protest more frequently when the 
state uses repression.  Repression negatively impacts members of the population, 
particularly relatives, friends, and communities of those targeted by the state, and this 
motivates those people to protest.   
However, I argue that the type of repression, and more specifically how gendered 
the state practices repression, matters.   The more that gender plays a role in determining 
who states target with repression, the more gender matters in the societal response to 
repression.   
In particular, I examine the use of forced disappearances.  Based on historical and 
contemporary accounts, I show that forced disappearance largely targets males, and thus 
motivates women’s protests but has no effect on protests by other groups.  When the state 
makes use of forced disappearances, some women are motivated to protest due to their 
connections to victims of repression.  Furthermore, opportunities to protest in these 
circumstances are more available to women than to men, due to their relatively lower 
likelihood of being targeted, as well as women’s distinctive positions in society and their 
ability to organize themselves as women.   
Not only do women have additional space relative to men to protest when the 
state is repressive, but individual women recognize that their gender can serve as a 
resource in such contexts.  Thus, individual women are more likely to participate in 
protests themselves when the state uses repression, closing the gender gap in protest 
participation between men and women. 
I test my theory of women’s protest using two unique approaches.  First, utilizing 
unique new data on women’s protests that is globally comprehensive for all countries 
from 1990-2009, I show that women’s protests are more frequent when the state is 
repressive, and that forced disappearances in particular motivate women’s protests, 
specifically, but do not have an observable effect on general protests.  Second, I utilize 
 
 
regionally comprehensive data on citizens in Latin America from 2006 and 2008 to show 
that women are more likely to participate in protests when the state uses forced 
disappearances, but that men are not more likely to participate in protests in repressive 
contexts. 
 
KEYWORDS:  women’s protest, women’s mobilization, gender, human rights,  
repression, forced disappearances 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 In 2017, just one day after the inauguration of controversial United States 
President Donald Trump, millions of women, largely dissatisfied with the election 
outcome, took to the streets in protest (Frostenson 2017).  While largely focused on 
Washington, D.C., this wave of protests affected countless US cities.  According to 
estimates by political scientists Jeremy Pressman and Erica Chenoweth (2017), over 4.2 
million people participated in sister marches across the US, making it likely to be the 
largest single day demonstration in United States history.  At least nine cities in the US 
had marches with crowds larger than 100,000, including Washington DC, Los Angeles, 
New York, Chicago, Boston, San Francisco, Denver, Seattle, and Oakland (Pressman and 
Chenoweth 2017). 
Figure 1 illustrates the data on Women’s March protests gathered by Pressman 
and Chenoweth (2017) graphically, showing the concentration of events.  As you can see, 
every state in the US had at least some protest activity.  The lion’s share of protests took 
place along the east coast of the US, with the largest concentration of protest activity in 
DC.  Indeed, though the incoming Trump administration was a prime motivation for 
many participants in the Women’s March, the protest was not limited to the US and was 
global in scale (Frostenson 2017).  Figure 1 also illustrates that every continent saw at 
least some protest activity from women.  Women across the globe participated in 
solidarity with the March, with sister marches on every continent (including Antarctica), 
and current estimates of global numbers of participants reaching as high as 300 thousand 
protestors worldwide (not including protestors in the US; Frostenson 2017).    
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Figure 1:  Map of Women’s March, January 2017
 
Notes:  Data on Women’s March activity from Pressman and Chenoweth (2017).  Protest 
locations geocoded using Stata command opencagegeo and the Open Cage Data API.  
Map created with CartoDB web app. 
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Why did women organize such a massive protest event?  Of course, there are 
many reasons that motivated the Women’s March, including fears of reversals in 
reproductive rights under a Republican administration, concerns over worker’s rights and 
employment non-discrimination, and uncertainty about women’s rights more generally.  
However, there was one key motivation for the Women’s March that has been under-
studied and under-theorized by the literature on women’s protests:  the Women’s March 
was an explicit protest against state-sanctioned violence.  In fact, if we look at the “Unity 
Principles” guiding the Women’s March, the very first item listed is entitled “Ending 
Violence” and reads as such: 
“Women deserve to live full and healthy lives, free of all forms of violence 
against our bodies. We believe in accountability and justice in cases of police 
brutality and ending racial profiling and targeting of communities of color. It is 
our moral imperative to dismantle the gender and racial inequities within the 
criminal justice system.”  - Women’s March Unity Principles (2017). 
In short, though the Women’s March arose for many reasons, state sanctioned violence, 
particularly police violence against minorities, was a key motivation for women who 
protested.  In this dissertation, I examine the role of state sanctioned violence in 
motivating and shaping women’s protests worldwide, demonstrating that the Women’s 
March of 2017 is not unique in this aspect:  women’s protests frequently arise as a 
response to state violence. 
Though the full consequences of the Women’s March are yet to be seen, this 
protest demonstrates that women are very involved in politics both in the US and 
worldwide, and are willing to take to the streets in order to make demands of their 
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government.  The stated desire to end state sanctioned violence which helped to motivate 
the Women’s March in particular is just another timely reminder that women do not 
organize solely in favor of policies or reforms that explicitly favor women, or that relate 
to explicitly gendered forms of inequality.  In fact, the Women’s March of 2017 is just 
the latest (and certainly largest) example in a long line of women protesting against 
unfavorable conditions. 
History is rife with examples of women taking to the streets to demand change, 
from protests demanding women’s suffrage in the late 1800s (Teele 2014, Banaszak 
1996), to the “Driving Protests” in Saudi Arabia in 2011 (Begum 2017).  As another 
example, in Latin America women frequently played a huge part in pro-democracy 
movements from the late 1970s to the 1990s (Waylen 1994).  In sub-Saharan Africa, 
women have disrobed in public as an act of protest against various social problems, such 
as rape culture (Thompson 2017).  Women have also been critical participants and 
organizers in major recent social movements such as Black Lives Matter (Kaleem 2016), 
while numerous women’s groups like Mothers Against Drunk Driving/MADD (Bilotta 
1985) or Mom’s Demands Action for Gun Sense in America (Follman 2014) have also 
formed specifically to advocate for non-gendered purposes.  In sum, women’s protests 
are a frequent occurrence, but are not always motivated by gender specific concerns, and 
understanding the role of gender in protest behavior more fully is critical to our 
understanding of contentious politics more generally. 
The Puzzles of Women’s Protests   
 Not only are women’s protests relatively frequent, they are also puzzling for a 
number of reasons.  In this dissertation in particular, I address three broad puzzles 
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regarding women’s protests.  First, protests are costly and often risky endeavors 
(Beaulieu 2014, Cunningham and Beaulieu 2010).  Taking part in a protest takes time and 
money at minimum.  In some countries, taking part in a protest can be quite dangerous 
for demonstrators, particularly in places where the government does not tolerate open 
opposition or areas where threats of arrest or violence are commonplace.  This is perhaps 
especially true for women, who often tend to have less access to networks of contacts and 
resources which enable them to protest (Verba, Burns, and Schlozman 1997).  The costs 
of protests are not purely born by participants, either:  the government highly values 
quiescence from the populace, and protests constitute a breach of social order that elites 
would prefer to avoid if they can (Davenport 2007, Moore 1998).  This raises the 
question:  if both sides would prefer to avoid protests, why do we see women protest? 
 Women’s protests are additionally puzzling because they are gendered.  In other 
words, when women and women’s groups choose to organize along explicitly gendered 
lines (Baldez 2002), they could be placing something of a ceiling on participation.  
Though men certainly can and do protest alongside women’s groups (e.g. the many men 
who turned out for the Women’s March in 2017), framing a protest as a “Women’s 
March” necessarily directs the messaging of the protest to one specific gender and could 
potentially halve the number of likely participants, at least in theory.  Taking the opposite 
line of reasoning, women often protest as part of a mixed-gender group alongside men 
and women.  If organizers of a protest have the option to organize in a mixed-gender 
way, including both men and women and possibly expanding the number of participants, 
why do women organize “as women” rather than as part of a broader, mixed-gender 
group?   
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 Finally, women’s protests are puzzling because of how rarely many or most 
women participate in protests.  Typically, women are much less likely to participate in 
protests than men, due to a variety of factors, such as less access to resources to lower 
levels of representation among political elites (Córdova and Rangel 2016, Espinal and 
Zhao 2015, Beauregard 2013, Barnes and Burchard 2012, Desposato and Norrander 
2009).  In spite of the lower likelihood of individual women participating in a protest 
relative to men, women’s protests are not uncommon at the country level.  This raises one 
final question:  Why do women sometimes choose to participate in protests, but not 
participate at other times? 
 This dissertation seeks to shed light on these three questions.  In particular, this 
work focuses on the relationship of women’s protests to state sanctioned violence, 
specifically state repression, and on how repression used by the state can both motivate 
protests and shape the types of protests we observe in society.  I build on previous 
thought about the determinants of protest in a number of ways.  Specifically, in Chapter 
2, I present a theory of women’s protests in three parts.  The first piece of my theory 
addresses the question “Why do women protest?”.  When explaining protests in general, 
scholars have argued that, one of the key motivators of protest activity is state repression,  
and that protests are more likely when the state uses repression (e.g. Moore 1998).  I 
argue that this applies to women’s protests as well, and that women will be more likely to 
protest when the state uses repression than if the state does not use repression.  The 
second piece of my theory focuses specifically on the question of why women frequently 
choose to protest “as women”, rather than seeking a potentially more inclusive non-
gendered protest strategy, when the state uses repression.   To answer this question, I 
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argue that the type of repression the state practices, and more importantly, the way gender 
influences the state’s practice of repression, motivates protests by women specifically.  In 
particular, the use of forced disappearances as a repressive tactic by the state often 
motivates women to protest, and encourages them to do so along gender lines, because 
women are less likely to be targeted for disappearance and because women are able to 
effectively frame their activism in gendered terms.  Finally, the third piece of my theory 
addresses the question of why women sometimes choose to participate in protests, but 
other times do not participate.  Here I argue that state repression changes the political 
environment in gendered ways, and the use of forced disappearances encourages women 
to participate in protests while discouraging men from participating. 
 Chapters 3 through 5 provide empirical tests of the implications of my theory.  
Chapter 3 focuses on the relationship of women’s protests and repression, and finds that 
women are far more likely to protest when the state is being highly repressive.  Chapter 4 
shows that women are particularly likely to protest when the state uses forced 
disappearances, rather than other repressive tactics (e.g. extrajudicial killings).  Chapter 5 
shows that individual women in society are more likely to participate in protests, relative 
to men, when the state uses disappearances.  Finally, I offer some conclusions about how 
this theory can illustrate other examples of women’s protest, such as the Women’s March 
of 2017, and how future research can benefit from the theory I develop. 
Patterns in Women’s Protests 
Using data on women’s protests from Murdie and Peksen (2014), Figure 2 shows 
the trend for women’s protests over time, with the number of observed women’s protests 
globally on the y-axis and the year on the x-axis.  Based on the available data, we see that 
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the absolute number of women’s protests peaked at around the year 1995.  Since that 
year, there has been a steady decline in the number of women’s protests, with intermittent 
upswings in 2001 and 2004.   
However, I should note two things regarding this time trend.  First, the available 
data stops in 2010, meaning that our data does not capture recent waves of massive 
protest like the Women’s March in 2017.  Second, throughout the entire time period 
under consideration, there are never fewer than 400 observed protests by women in a 
given year, which equates to roughly two women’s protests per year for every country on 
earth.  Thus, even as women’s protests have declined over time, they are still a frequent 
and important global occurrence that merits scholarly attention.  Recent events such as 
the Women’s March of 2017 have illustrated that this observed decline is likely not 
permanent, or at the very least, that it does not place an effective ceiling on the size and 
scope of women’s protests.   
In sum, when we look at the available data on women’s protests, we observe that 
women’s protests are frequent on a global scale, but that the number of protests by 
women has declined from an observed peak in the early 1990s.  Recent events suggest 
that women’s protests may be rising in frequency.  In the next section, I examine what we 
know about women’s protest from previous works on the subject.   
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Figure 2:  Women’s Protests over Time 
 
Notes:  Data on women’s protests comes from Murdie and Peksen (2014).  The y-axis 
shows the total, global number of women’s protests for a given year.    
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What We Know about Women’s Protests  
Why do women’s protests occur?  Previous works have offered three major 
answers to explain contentious mobilization in general:  grievance, political opportunity 
structure, and resource mobilization (Beaulieu 2014, Murdie and Peksen 2014).  In this 
section, I outline each theory in turn, and explain the general expectations suggested by 
each theoretical framework as they apply to women’s protests, specifically.  In the next 
chapter, I lay out my theory linking state repression to women’s protests, which builds 
upon these previous approaches by examining the role of state repression in shaping 
grievances, opportunities, and resources in gendered ways, and allows for new insights 
into the causes of women’s protests. 
The first major perspective on the origins of protests is grievance based.  
Grievance based theories (sometimes called “relative deprivation” theories) focus on the 
motivations to protest, and suggest that discontent with the current political system leads 
to collective dissent (Gurr 1968, 1970, Davies 1962).  Thus, individuals’ feelings of 
discontent and dissatisfaction with the status quo are primary motivators for collective 
mobilization.  The feeling that one’s status is not in line with one’s expectations is a 
necessary condition for dissent (Gurr 1970).  To the extent that women perceive society 
as unequal and explicitly biased against them, we should expect that women would 
protest more and to organize as well (Simmons 2009).  Explictly discriminatory laws and 
policies against women have indeed motivated a large number of women’s protests.  For 
example, many women protested in favor of women’s suffrage (Teele 2014, Banaszak 
1996, Costain 1992), in favor of legal protections from violence against women (Htun 
and Weldon 2012), and in favor of economic equality for women (Craske 1999).   
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There are two key caveats to mention for this explanation of women’s protests.  
The first is that unfairness in the status quo, on its own, does not consistently lead to 
dissent.  For example, research looking at marital satisfaction finds that women are not 
less satisfied even when expected to take on much more household work, due to 
socialization and low expectations (Greenstein 1996, Major 1989, 1993).  Works on the 
gender wage gap find similar patterns (Jackson 1989).  The second caveat is that women 
do not only mobilize in protest against gender discrimination.  For example, women have 
been critical participants in democratization movements (Alvarez 1990, Waylen 1994, 
Craske 1999), women have protested general economic conditions (Safa 1990), and many 
women have even taken part in rebellions and led revolutionary groups (Kampwirth 
2014, Jaquette 1973).  In sum, though grievances caused by gender discrimination are 
one key motivator for women’s protests, context seems to determine when objective 
unfairness is perceived as unfair and thus leads to dissent, and women’s protests are often 
motivated by non-gender specific goals. 
Political opportunity/process theories focus on the opportunity to mobilize rather 
than the motivation for doing so, and focus on the perceived ability to succeed in a 
political goal.  In other words, mobilization depends on a favorable political environment:  
individuals must have some confidence they could succeed, and the government must be 
somewhat tolerant of dissent (Costain 1992, Tilly 1978, Lipset 1963).  In general, this 
perspective suggests that we should observe more protests by women under open, 
democratic societies that tolerate opposition, and wherein persuasion can more easily 
result in reform.  Past works have found that women’s protests are indeed more likely 
during political openings, such as periods of partisan realignment (Baldez 2002, 
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Macaulay 2006, Costain 1992), during transitional periods when a state is democratizing 
(Waylen 1994, Alvarez 1990, Molyneux 1985), and when the state is at least somewhat 
open (Murdie and Peksen 2014).    
One important thing to note, however, is that opportunities are not objective or 
static:  activists must perceive an opportunity, and to an extent, activists construct 
opportunities to protest (della Porta and Tarrow 2004, Banazak 1996).  For example, 
under the military regimes of the 1970s and 1980s in Latin America, the state was 
incredibly repressive, but women took to the streets in protest of both human rights 
violations (Navarro 1989, Schirmer 1989).  They were able to do this, in part, by 
strategically employing and manipulating the same cultural frames of motherhood and 
family used by the regime to quash dissent from other groups, such as labor unions 
(Navarro 1989).  In short, even apparently “closed” or repressive systems are still 
vulnerable to dissent from creative activists. 
Resource mobilization theories focus instead on the ability of groups to mobilize 
(rather than their motivations or opportunities for doing so).  Access to resources mitigate 
the cost of mobilization (Boulding 2014, Bell et al. 2013, Cole 2013, Tilly 1978, 
McCarthy and Zald 1977).  Generally, scholars looking at the role of resources in protests 
have focused on either individual resources (e.g. Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995) or 
group/organizational resources (e.g. Boulding 2014).  Individuals require things like free-
time, money, transportation, communication tools, and organizational skills to protest 
(Murdie and Peksen 2014, Murdie and Bhasin 2011).  Groups facilitate protests by 
gathering, coordinating, facilitating, and distributing all the aforementioned resources to 
interested parties.  For both individuals weighing whether to participate in protests and 
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groups trying to mobilize others for a protest, more resources, are thought to lead to more 
protests. 
In the next chapter, I build on all three theories of mobilization to examine the 
causes of women’s protests specifically as they relate to practices of state repression.  
The first two hypotheses I present reflect the consistency of effects of repression on 
protest activity across women’s protest and protest in the general population, while the 
third hypothesis reflects the distinctiveness of women protesting state repression as 
women.  The final two hypotheses shift the unit of analysis from the country level to the 
individual level, and suggest that while it is generally the case that women are less likely 
to participate in protests, women actually become at least as likely as men to participate 
in protests when the state uses repression. 
Contributions of this Dissertation 
 This dissertation contributes to our broader understanding of politics in at least 
four ways.  First, our understanding of women’s protests is still relatively 
underdeveloped.  While many authors have made important contributions to 
understanding women’s protests, works on this subject tend to focus on a single case or a 
small number of cases (Mooney 2007, Baldez 2002, Banaszak 1996, Alvarez 1990, 
Molyneux 1985).  This is partially because, until very recently, no globally 
comprehensive data on women’s protests existed at the cross-national level (Murdie and 
Peksen 2014).  In this project, I seek to provide a more globally comprehensive view of 
patterns women’s protests, particularly as they relate to repressive actions taken by the 
state.  This approach is useful because it allows me to both build my argument with as 
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general a scope as possible, and  to test its implications on as wide a range of data as is 
currently available. 
I contribute to our theoretical understanding of women’s protests by developing a 
novel theory of women’s protests which builds on past perspectives of protest.  First, I 
apply the logic of repression and dissent to women’s protests in particular.  In this 
respect, I argue that women’s protests are similar to other protests in that they are a 
reaction against the negative actions of the state.  However, building upon both grievance 
and political opportunity structure arguments, I also argue that women’s protests are 
distinct, and are different in many respects from general protests that include both men 
and women.  Because the state practices repression in gendered ways, women are 
affected differently by repression and react to it in different ways.  In particularly 
repressive contexts, women actually have additional advantages for mobilizing that give 
them agency to protest when other groups cannot.  Thus, I show that under particular 
political contexts, certain identity categories (in this case, womanhood) confer additional 
resources for mobilization to potential protestors. 
My theory not only contributes to our understanding of protests but also to the 
scholarly understanding of the effects of repression, by suggesting that not all repression 
is practiced the same way and different types of repression can meet very different 
reactions from the public.  My research suggests that we should continue the process of 
opening up the “black box” of repression to think about specific types of repression in 
order to best understand the possible consequences of repression.  To date, all of the 
quantitative human rights scholarship which looks at specific repressive tactics has 
focused exclusively on the practice of torture (Conrad 2014, Conrad, Haglund, and 
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Moore 2014, Conrad and Ritter 2013, Conrad and Moore 2010, Vreeland 2008)1.  This 
dissertation represents a first step towards broader theorizing about the other types of 
repressive tactics by focusing predominantly on the practice of forced disappearance.  I 
find that the state does not apply all types of repression equally to all groups in society, 
and so the type of repression used matters significantly for what reactions are likely to 
occur and from which social groups (like protests from women, in this case).   
My theory aims to be general and can be used to think about other important 
questions.  There are three main ways in which I anticipate future research can utilize my 
theory.  First, my theory aims to be general, and can provide a framework for integrating 
future work on the subject of women’s protests.  For example, in the conclusions of this 
project, I speculate about the ways in which my theory can help us to understand the 
Women’s March of 2017.  Secondarily, my theory can be used as a way to understand 
protests by other marginalized groups besides women.  My theory can be applied to 
dynamics of protest by ethnic and racial minorities, religious minorities, and other groups 
where the state is using repression in a targeted manner, and it suggests that members of 
the group that are the most targeted may be the least able to protest, but that .  Thirdly, 
my theory can be used to inform policy from international actors and advocacy groups 
concerned with human rights abuses.  My research suggests that in certain repressive 
contexts, women and women’s groups are highly likely to protest, and thus organizations 
                                                 
1 For some conceptual/qualitative work on extrajudicial killings, see Kessler and Werner 
(2008), Ojie (2006), and Guiora (2004).  For some similar works on political 
imprisonment, see Pohlman (2008) and Vo (2003).  Note that none of these works are 
cross-national or quantitative in nature. 
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should anticipate women’s protests in those circumstances and provide additional support 
and coverage to help keep women safe during protests. 
Finally, I also contribute to our understanding of protests by empirically 
examining an as-yet underutilized source of data on women’s protests collected by 
Murdie and Peksen (2014).  To date, only Murdie and Peksen (2014) have used this 
wealth of data to empirically examine the determinants of women’s protests.  In addition, 
I also examine the determinants of women’s protests at two levels, using both country 
level data and individual level data.  This two-level approach allows me to better 
illustrate the nature of protests as a group and individual level activity, that require both 
organizational resources and individual willingness to participate.  
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Chapter 2 – Theory 
In this chapter, I lay out my argument.  The theory I present focuses on answering 
three main questions.  First, why do women’s protest occur?  Or rather, in what ways are 
women’s protests similar to other, non-gendered protests?  Secondarily, why do women 
protest “as women”?  In other words, why do women sometimes choose to organize 
around their gender identity, and other times take part in broader protests involving both 
men and women?  Finally, why do individual women choose to participate in protests?  
Put another way, in what contexts are women more likely to participate in protests, 
relative to men?   
In the following sections, I provide additional context to these questions based on 
past works on contentious politics.  I first define the key concepts used in this work, 
namely protests and women’s protests.  Then, I further elaborate on the three theoretical 
puzzles this work seeks to illuminate.  After fully setting up these theoretical puzzles, I 
provide my answers to these questions, creating a new theoretical framework for 
conceptualizing and explaining women’s protests which focuses on the role of state 
repression in motivating and shaping women’s activism, while integrating and building 
upon previous theories of repression and dissent, grievances, political opportunity 
structures, and resource mobilization. 
What is a Protest? 
Before turning to the larger theoretical questions of this dissertation, it is worth 
elaborating on the general conceptual framework and working definitions of key terms 
used in my argument.  In particular, first I wish to briefly define “protests”, draw 
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conceptual distinctions between protests and the related concept of a “social movement”.  
I elaborate on the definition of “women’s protests” specifically in the following section.   
Conceptually, I adopt the definition of protest from Barnes and Kaase (1979):  
protests are direct, political actions that are “unconventional” and non-institutional, 
taking place outside of formal channels for revising the status quo such as voting or legal 
challenges to policy.  Protests must involve a person or group of people gathered in a 
specific location.  There are various forms a protest can take, such as sit-ins, marches, 
vigils, rallies, or pickets.  Protests are specific events, that occur over a defined time 
period, organized by a group of people, that seek to challenge the status quo.  The key 
characteristic of a protest for my purposes is that it must be “revisionist” (Quaranta 
2015):  protests seek to change some aspect of social reality, for example, to raise wages 
or end child labor practices. 
The major confusion present in some previous work is the distinction between a 
protest and a social movement.  Protests are, in fact, conceptually distinct from social 
movements, but the distinctions between the two concepts is not always made clear in 
past works.  Protests and social movements are herein defined as related but distinct 
sociopolitical phenomena.  I adopt the definition of what constitutions a social movement 
originating within the resource mobilization perspective laid out by McCarthy and Zald 
(1977):  a social movement is defined as “a set of opinions and beliefs which represents 
preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution 
of a society”.  In other words, social movements are abstract changes in public opinion or 
perception among groups of citizens, rather than specific gatherings of people with a 
concrete goal.  For example, the US women’s suffrage movement was the broader 
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philosophical and political movement which aimed to change people’s preferences in 
favor of giving women the right to vote, whereas the Woman Suffrage Procession of 
1913 was a protest organized by members of that movement.  Protests may occur in the 
context of a social movement (e.g. members of the Black Lives Matter movement 
coordinate a “die-in”), or they may arise spontaneously as a reaction to specific changes 
in the political environment (e.g. previously unorganized workers go on strike due to a 
new overtime regulation).   
This work is intended to examine protests, exclusively, rather than social 
movements.  My theory should apply equally to all protests regardless of whether they 
occur as part of a broader social movement or spontaneously.  In this dissertation, I do 
not assume or hypothesize about any causal or temporal relationship between these 
concepts:  a protest may be organized as part of a social movement, a spontaneous protest 
may gain momentum and eventually help to create a social movement, a social movement 
may not be associated with any specific protests, and likewise a protest may or may not 
be associated with any particular social movement.  Broadly speaking, conditions thought 
to give rise to social movements are thought to apply equally to protests, and vice versa, 
and insights from scholars of social movements are critical for understanding protests. 
If there are meaningful distinctions between the conditions thought to give rise to 
or encourage social movements and those that give rise to or encourage protests, a broad 
reading of the literature does not provide clues in that direction.  Generally, authors who 
study women’s social movements or protests often treat the two concepts as essentially 
interchangeable.  Naturally, this does not prove that there are not meaningful distinctions 
or differences in causal pathways between these two concepts, merely that if such 
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distinctions do exist, they are currently ill defined by the literature available.  This work 
does not seek to illuminate any such differences in conceptualization or differences in 
causal pathways for women’s protests, movements, or both, nor to criticize past authors 
for treating these two concepts as one, merely to point out this prevailing implicit 
equivalence found in past works. 
What is a Women’s Protest? 
This dissertation is predominately an exploration of the factors that lead to 
women’s protests, specifically, and an attempt to situate women’s dissent in a broader 
understanding of social unrest.  However, the definitional question of “what is a women’s 
protest?” deserves further consideration, because the definition used will have conceptual 
and theoretical implications for the rest of the work, and prior works tend to treat the 
meaning the concept of a “women’s protest” as self-evident.  What characteristics 
distinguishes a “women’s protest” from the more general category of “protests”, as 
defined in the previous section?  There are three possible attributes for defining a 
women’s protest. 
The first condition is perhaps the most obvious.  A women’s protest is a protest in 
which the participants are, primarily or exclusively, women.  In other words, a women’s 
protest is a protest “of women”.  I argue that this is a necessary but insufficient condition 
for defining a women’s protest.  After all, women have enthusiastically participated in 
many protests that are not considered women’s protests, such as the pro-democratization 
movements in many regions of the world (Waylen 1994, Alvarez 1990, Baldez 2003).  
The heavy involvement of women in a protest, on its own, is not enough to delineate a 
women’s protest from other kinds of protest. 
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The second condition is the most important for this work.  In order for a protest to 
“count” as a women’s protest, it must be framed as a women’s protest (Baldez 2002).  
Thus, a women’s protest is a protest “by women” – one that is characterized by both 
participants and outside observers as led by a “woman” or “women” (Murdie and Pekson 
2014).  In other words, a women’s protest is one in which the organizers of the protest 
choose to call it a women’s protest, specifically.  This is arguably the most important 
qualification for defining women’s protests, and likely why previous authors treat the 
concept as given:  A women’s protest is a protest that defines and frames itself as a 
women’s protest (leading to the “know it when you see it” approach adopted by some 
previous works).  I argue that this, too, is a necessary but insufficient attribute for a 
women’s protest.  It is reasonable to also require that at least some number of women be 
involved in a protest, on top of the protest being framed as a women’s protest.  In 
conjunction with the first condition, these are the two conceptual conditions that I adopt 
to define women’s protests in this project.  In other words, when I am speaking of 
women’s protests, I mean a protest that both involves women (primarily) and is framed as 
a women’s protest by the participants of the protest. 
I adopt these first two conditions to define women’s protests for my purposes.  
However, there is a third potential way to conceptualize women’s protests, which is 
worth mentioning here even though I do not adopt this conceptualization.  This view 
looks at the stated goal of the protest to see whether it is focused on women’s issues.  In 
other words, this view is that women’s protests are protests “for women”, where the 
explicit goal of the protest is to improve or change the status of women, specifically.   
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I do not adopt this “goal focused” definition of women’s protests, for two reasons.  
The first is to avoid the trap of essentialism.  Women have many and varied political 
interests (just as men do), not all of which are predominantly or even particularly gender 
specific.  As Alvarez (1990) put it:   
“When one considers that women span all social classes, ethnicities, religions, 
nationalities, political ideologies, and so on, then an infinite array of interests 
could be construed as women’s interests.  Gender, class, race, ethnicity, sexual 
preference and other social characteristics determine women’s social posititioning 
and shape women’s interests.”  
Women often do protest for gender specific reasons or goals (for example, women’s 
suffrage), but a “women’s protest” could theoretically be about anything – police 
violence, economic inequality, education policy and so on. 
In addition to avoiding definitionally flattening women’s protests into only 
protests about “women-specific” issues, there are theoretical reasons I do not adopt this 
condition as part of my conceptual framework.  This project seeks, in large part, to 
illuminate the choice of framing a protest as a “women’s protest”, especially in 
circumstances where the goal of, or motivation for, the protest is not specific to women.  
Such a question would not be possible if I defined women’s protests as only having 
gender specific goals, nor would such a conception capture the vast array of reasons for 
women’s protests.  For these reasons, I reject conceptualizing women’s protests as 
protests about “women- specific” issues or with gender specific goals.   
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Why do Women’s Protests Occur? 
Protesting is a costly activity.  At a minimum, a participant has to have time off 
from work and other responsibilities, and transportation to an event that could be far from 
their home.  Above that, there are the many activities needed to organize a protest, such 
as securing a location, registering necessary permits, spreading the message to as many 
people as possible.  For women in particular, the costs for protesting can be particularly 
high, since women in many families are often expected to do unpaid work at home, such 
as childrearing and housekeeping, in addition to often working outside the home as well 
(Craig and Mullan 2010, Craske 1999, Safa 1990, Stevens 1973).  Protests can also carry 
high risks for participants:  national governments and local police forces are often quite 
hostile to opposition (Beaulieu 2014, Cunningham and Beaulieu 2010).  Protestors can 
face arrest, physical harm, or even death when the political environment is unfavorable. 
However, protests are not merely costly for those participating in them or 
organizing them – protests are also quite costly, and risky, for the state.  Protests are a 
sign of weak political institutions – if the state is failing to respond to the needs of 
citizens, they are more likely to protest (Boulding 2014).  States value quiescence from 
the populace, because obedience and peaceful order supports the extraction of taxes, the 
creation of wealth, and increases the legitimacy of the state (Davenport 2007).  Protest 
can halt or interfere with business activity in affected areas, cause blockages of traffic or 
trade, and otherwise disrupt the daily activities of society.  At the extremes, protest can 
foment into full scale revolution, encourage coups d’état, and otherwise lead to a 
complete breakdown of political order (Johnson and Thyne 2016, Casper and Tyson 
2014).   
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Given all these costs and risks, it is reasonable to assume that both the state and 
protest participants would actually prefer to avoid protesting, if at all possible.  In other 
words, we can think of protests as inefficient bargaining outcomes:  both sides (i.e. both 
dissidents and the state) would prefer to come to an agreement without actually needing 
to pay the costs, or run the risks of allowing, protest, because protest is costly (Beaulieu 
2014, c.f. Fearon 1995).  However, we see that protests occur rather frequently within 
nearly every country.  This begs the question:  why do women protest?  I return with an 
answer to this question in later sections of this chapter, focusing on the undertheorized 
but important motivation that state repression provides for women’s protests, but first, I 
elaborate on this question further by asking more specific questions about women’s 
protests. 
Why do Women Protest “as Women”? 
Women’s protests are not only puzzling because protests in general are thought of 
as ex post inefficient or failed bargaining outcomes.  Women’s protests are also 
interesting because they are explicitly gendered.  Why do women choose to protest “as 
women”, that is, on the basis of their shared gender identity (Baldez 2002)?  In other 
words, why do women sometimes frame a protest as a “women’s protest”, but at other 
times women simply take part in broader, non-gendered protests (i.e. protests that make 
no reference to gender and do not use gender identity as a mobilizing factor)? 
This is a particularly interesting puzzle to consider, because framing a protest as a 
women’s protest may well limit the potential number of participants to only women (and, 
perhaps, those sympathetic to women as a political group).  This is not to say, of course, 
that people who are not women can’t participate in a women’s protest, but it seems likely 
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that they are less willing to do so.  If we assume that, all else being equal, protest 
organizers would prefer to organize the largest protest event possible (which seems like a 
reasonable assumption to make), limiting the potential number of participants by framing 
the protest as a women’s protest doesn’t make sense.   
The most obvious answer from previous works is that women frame a protest as a 
women’s protest when the goal of the protest is gender specific.  In other words, women 
may mobilize “as women” in service of their strategic gender interests (Molyneux 1985).  
For example, we could think of protests by women in support of something like women’s 
suffrage as having goals specific to, and arguably primarily beneficial to, women.  For 
protests where the goal of the protest is explicitly gendered, and thus the protest is 
already unlikely to attract participants who are not women, framing the protest in 
explicitly gendered terms might not be seen as limiting. 
However, this ignores the reality that women’s protests have occurred with as 
many goals as any other type of protest.  Women are not a monolithic group or a unitary 
actor, and women participate on all sides of almost every major political conflict that 
exists.  For example, women participate heavily in pro-democracy movements (Waylen 
1994, Noonan 1995), human rights protests (Navarro 1989, Schirmer 1989), economic 
equality protests (Safa 1990), and even full-scale revolutions (Kampwirth 2014, Jaquette 
1973).  Thus, it would be a mistake to assume that women’s protests only occur for 
gender specific goals. 
And so the question remains:  given that women’s protests occur for all kinds of 
reasons, why do women frame protests as women’s protests?  In the rest of this chapter, I 
argue that women’s protests are, in some ways, similar to other forms of protest, but that 
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gender also plays a significant role in shaping protest behavior in ways that are not 
obvious.  I argue that women dissidents frame some protests as “women’s protests” 
strategically, choosing to make the trade-off of limiting the number of potential 
participants in exchange for perceived benefits, but not always because the protest has 
gender specific goals. 
Why do Women Participate in Protests? 
Up to now, I have focused largely on the protest behavior of women as a group, 
and the collective framing of protests by participants.  Women’s protests are fairly 
frequent at the country level, and women’s protests are more common in some 
circumstances than others.  However, protests are made up of individuals, and without 
participants, there can be no protest.  As mentioned earlier, protests are costly for 
participants, and women in particular can find it especially difficult to participate in 
protests.  This is partly because women often have less access to the resources necessary 
to take part in protests (Schlozman, Burns, and Verba 1994, Verba, Burns, and 
Schlozman 1997).  Economic marginalization leads women to participate less in civic life 
compared to men (Craske 1999).  Women are often expected to take on additional 
responsibilities at home, even as more and more women have entered the labor force 
(Craske 1999, Stevens 1973).  The literature generally suggests that women will be less 
likely to protest than men. 
Empirical findings from recent works bear out this expectation.  Much research 
using survey data to compare men and women’s political activism has found a “gender 
participation gap”, the consistent finding in survey-based research that women are less 
politically active than men.  Specifically, women are less likely to participate in protests 
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than men (Desposato and Norrander 2009, Zetterberg 2009, Córdova and Rangel 2016).  
Works like Córdova and Rangel (2016) have examined the conditions under which this 
gender gap shrinks or disappears, and women protest at roughly equal rates as men.  
However, works seeking to elaborate on which political conditions can mitigate the 
gender gap in participation have largely focused on the role of certain institutional 
arrangements, namely proportional representation (Beauregard 2013), gender quotas 
(Barnes and Burchard 2013), and compulsory voting (Córdova and Rangel 2016) on the 
gap between men and women’s political participation. 
Comparatively less is known about the role of other state practices in shaping the 
gender participation gap.  So, this puzzle still remains:  why do individual women take 
part in protests?  Why do women sometimes participate in protests, but at other times 
tend to stay home?  Later in this chapter, I look at the role of state repression in shaping 
an individual’s choice of whether or not to participate in a protest.   Though women are 
usually less likely to participate in protests than men, I argue that when the state is 
repressive, particularly when the state practices repression in a gendered way, gender 
identity can serve as a resource to women and provide women with additional space to 
protest relative to men.   
General Theoretical Framework 
In this chapter, I have set up three major related theoretical puzzles:  why do 
women’s protest occur, why do women protest “as women”, and why do individual 
women participate in protests?  These are broad, complex questions with conceivably 
infinite answers.  Rather than attempt to give a complete accounting for all the possible 
answers to these questions, I instead focus this dissertation on the goal of providing a few 
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novel, but specific, answers to these questions from an undertheorized and understudied 
perspective.  In particular, this dissertation focuses on the links between women’s protest 
and repression by the state.  I argue that state repressive practices both motivate protests 
by women, and shape the form that those protests eventually take, in meaningful ways. 
Before turning to my argument, I should note how my approach differs from 
previous theories specifically explaining women’s protests.  There are generally two 
previous approaches to studying the causes of women’s protests.  The first, best 
exemplified by Murdie and Peksen (2014), is to expling women’s protests with a gender 
conscious application of perspectives used to explain other protests.  Murdie and Peksen 
(2014) thus seek to explain women’s protests by applying general explanations for 
protests, such as resource mobilization or political opportunity structures, to women’s 
protests, by looking at how those factors could be measured for women, specifically.  For 
example, Murdie and Peksen (2014) succeed in showing that women’s protests are 
motivated by discrimination against women in the political and economic arena.  I build 
on their work by examining women’s protests in the broader context of social unrest – 
theorizing that women’s protests can sometimes be a result of negative actions by the 
state which are not wholly specific to women.   
The second approach generally examines women’s protests (or social movements) 
as uniquely gendered phenomena.  Rather than treat women’s protests as similar to other 
protests, these works examine women’s protest in isolation.  In particular, Baldez (2002) 
serves as a primary example of this approach.  She builds her argument starting from the 
observation that all women’s movements share something in common:  the decision to 
mobilize as women, on the basis of commonly held notions of women’s identity.  Her 
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work seeks to explain why women perceive particular historical moments in gendered 
terms (thus choosing to frame their mobilization as women’s movements).  She argues 
that activist women will frame their movement as a women’s movement when gender 
serves as a useful unifying frame, because gender is the characteristic that all women 
share.  Baldez (2002) further argues that the single most universal aspect women share in 
common, despite their unique individual experiences, is a history of political 
marginalization.  Baldez (2002) shows that women frame their movement in gendered 
terms strategically, but only focuses on a single condition that might incentivize that 
framing strategy (i.e. partisan realignments).  I build on her work by returning to her 
observation that all women’s protests share one commonality:  they were framed as 
women’s protests by participants.  This dissertation expands on her approach by 
examining other conditions, besides partisan realignment, that incentivize framing a 
protest in gendered terms. 
My theoretical approach thus differs from both of these past approaches but 
explicitly builds from their foundations.  Rather than treat women’s protests as motivated 
only by woman-specific discrimination, or focus exclusively on the shared gender-
specific framing that all women’s protests exhibit, I adopt an integrated approach.  I 
explicitly theorize about circumstances that encourage women’s protests, specifically, 
and which circumstances might affect women’s mobilization in the same way as any 
other protest.  This approach allows me to better situate women’s protests in a broader 
understanding of social unrest.  I accomplish these goals by focusing on the specific 
relationships between women’s protests and state repressive practices. 
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In Figure 3, I outline the general process described by my theory.  The process 
involves 3 key actors, the state, activists, and the citizenry.  At decision point 1, the state 
decides whether or not to use repression.  If the state uses repression, activists at point 2 
decide to either organize a protest or not.  Given that at least some activists seek to 
organize a protest, they decide at point 3 whether or not to frame the protest as a 
“women’s protest”.  Finally, at point 4, other citizens that are observing the ongoing 
protest can decide whether to join in a protest, or not.  
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Figure 3:  Theoretical Process of State Repression and Protest 
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So, using the illustration in Figure 3 as a guide, what causes women’s protests?  
The general story goes as follows:  the state first decides whether or not to engage in 
repression.  If the state does not use repression, there may still be protests, but those 
protests will not be motivated by repression but by something else (e.g. adverse economic 
conditions).  If the state does repress, citizens may decide to protest against the 
repression, or not.  If the citizens decide not to protest, the process ends, and no protests 
are observed under the repressive context.  If citizens decide to protest, they must then 
decide how to frame that protest.  There are a potentially endless number of possible 
framings for protests, but for my purposes I am only interested in the choice between 
framing a protest as a women’s protest or not.  As I will argue in more detail later in this 
chapter, the more gendered the practice of repression is, the more women’s protests are 
incentivized compared to general protests.  Finally, given that either a women’s protest, 
general protest, or both, are occurring in a given context, individual women are then 
faced with the choice of joining or not joining the protest. 
 The rest of this chapter fills in the details for this general outline.  In the next 
section, I contextualize decision points 1 and 2, showing that when the state is repressive, 
women are motivated to protest.  In the following section, I examine decision point 3, by 
opening up the “black box” of repression to show that repression by the state is gendered, 
and thus certain repressive tactics are more likely to incentivize women’s protests 
compared to others.  In the final section, I examine decision point 4, and argue that under 
specific repressive contexts, women’s gender identity is a salient political resource that 
encourages more women to take part in protests. 
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Women Protest Repression 
First, let us examine decision points 1 and 2 from Figure 3.  In this section, I 
argue that state repression constitutes a salient grievance against the state.  Thus, I will 
argue, when the state is repressive, women are motivated to protest.  This expectation, for 
the purposes of this section, is not gendered:  in this respect, I argue that women’s 
protests are, in this way, similar to any other protest.  However, note that in the following 
two sections, I show that the full picture is more complex than this starting point, and that 
gender plays a significant role in both the practice of repression by states and the 
experience of, and reaction to, repression by citizens. 
In arguing that repression from the state motivates women’s protests, I build on a 
number of previous theoretical explanations for protests.  In particular, I build on the 
grievance perspective (Gurr 1970) to argue that repression is a key motivation for 
women’s protests, and one that has not been thoroughly examined by those studying 
women’s protests.  Turning first to the grievance perspective, the grievance literature 
suggests that people protest when they have a salient grievance against the state.  As 
such, past works looking at women’s protests specifically have found that women protest 
when they have a grievance.  For example, women are more likely to protest when 
women are not politically equal to men in a given country (Murdie and Peksen 2014).   
However, protest activity within a given country generally varies a great deal over 
time (see, for example, the variation I showcase within Latin American countries in 
Figure # in Chapter 5), while women’s political status does not change much over time 
within any given country.  Thus, I argue that we should broaden our focus from relatively 
static factors that constitute grievances (such as women’s legal rights which change 
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infrequently and are largely stable over time) to include more fluid negative state 
behaviors that might cause women to have grievances against the state that might have 
little to do with women’s rights specifically. 
In particular, I argue that state repression is another salient grievance that 
motivates women to protest.  When the state is repressive, I expect that women will 
protest more frequently.  When the state targets citizens with repressive tactics, women 
will be affected just as men are.  Thus, women will be motivated to protest much the 
same as men would be.  Protests are costly endeavors, but the possibility of a protest 
stopping the state from repressing further in the future provides a benefit that some 
citizens and some women will find valuable enough to incentivize protesting.  Consider 
the following accounts of contemporary repression in Mexico, historical repression in 
Argentina, which show that state repression is one important cause of women’s protests. 
The 2014 Disappearances in Mexico 
On September 26th, 2014, 43 students in Mexico were kidnapped by police and 
subsequently “disappeared” (Semple 2016).  The students were undergraduates at a 
teacher’s college, and had been en route to a protest event (BBC 2016).  According to a 
recent report, the government of Mexico has detained 123 people, including many police 
officials, in relation to the kidnappings, and the government has also linked the local 
Iguala police force to a powerful drug gang (Semple 2016).  While some remains have 
been recovered and identified, the ultimate fate of “The 43” is still largely unknown, and 
the government of Mexico has been characteristically uncooperative with international 
investigations (Wilkinson 2016, Schwartz 2015).  Journalists and investigators reporting 
on the incident have been subjected to death threats and killed in some instances 
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(Vulliamy 2015).  In the wake of the disappearances, a wave of protests erupted in Iguala 
and elsewhere in Mexico, some of which turned violent (Wilkinson 2016, Schwartz 2015, 
Castillo 2014).  Parents and relatives of the disappeared have been active in seeking 
information about their children, advocating for justice to be done, and coordinating 
protests against the government and its handling of the situation (Alfred 2015). 
The mothers of the missing students, in particular, have been especially prominent 
in protesting against the government.  In an interview with reporters, Maria de Jesus 
Tlatempa, whose son is among the missing students, said that protesters would continue 
to make demands to the President of Mexico: “We won’t rest, we will be a pebble in his 
shoes. We won’t go home” (quoted in both Alfred 2015, and Goldman 2015).  Another 
mother, addressing a crowd of angry protesters, said “We’re poor, but we’re not stupid 
[…] We want the truth, we don’t want any more lies […] We’ll fight until we find our 
sons” (quoted in Goldman 2015).  One group of mothers travelled nearly 2,000 miles to 
the United States, attempting to meet with the Pope during his visit and ask him to speak 
out against the government (NBC 2015).  Nor were the mothers of disappeared victims 
the only women to turn out in protest.  Maria Antonieta Lugo, a member of a group of 
housewives who joined in the protests without experiencing a personal loss themselves, 
articulated that they had joined in "because we have children of the same age" as the 
students who had gone missing, "This could happen to our children as well” (quoted in 
Stevenson and Sherman 2014). 
Even though forced disappearances first gained attention during the earlier era of 
military dictatorships in Latin America, the issue of forced disappearance remains 
gravely important in many countries, and accounts of these instances suggest that similar 
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dynamics still apply.  While the most recent incident in Iguala, Mexico, certainly drew a 
great deal of international attention and domestic ire, the disappearances of the 43 
students hardly represent an unusual occurrence in Mexico or Latin America more 
generally, even in the post-democratization period.  During Mexico’s recent “war on 
drugs” (2006-2012), upwards of 26,000 individuals are estimated to have been 
disappeared (CBS 2013).  Note that those numbers are the government’s official 
estimates, and likely represent an undercount of the cases.  More than 16,000 unidentified 
bodies have been found, and the disappearances have continued largely unabated under 
the present presidential administration, despite campaign promises to end the war on 
drugs (Human Rights Watch 2014).  Just as was the case in Argentina during the “dirty 
war”, most of the victims have been young, working class men with families (Human 
Rights Watch 2014).   
Nor is Mexico alone in the region, as Colombia, Brazil, and the Dominican 
Republic have all recently grappled with forced disappearances.  Colombia, in part due to 
a long running civil conflict, is perhaps the worst case in recorded history, with 
disappearances occurring on an unprecedented scale.  Government estimates put the 
number of missing persons at an upwards of 51,000 (even with known underreporting), 
with a large number of cases occurring from 2000 to 2003 (Haugaard 2010).  As with the 
43 Iguala students, parents and relatives of the disappeared have advocated for justice and 
desperately sought information about their children’s fates (Human Rights Watch 2014).   
Women’s Protests under the Military Regimes of Latin America 
The contemporary accounts above, which showed women taking to the streets to 
make demands even as the government is highly repressive of opposition, is corroborated 
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by the history of Latin America during the period of military rule which saw similar 
accounts of women’s protests.  In particular, historical evidence from Argentina suggests 
that repression by the state motivates women to protest.  During the “dirty war” in 
Argentina (1974 to 1983), an estimated 10 to 30 thousand people were “disappeared” by 
the military dictatorship (Wilson 1993).  There were at least 300 different detention 
centers in operation, and many of their prisoners went undocumented.  Many of those 
taken were tortured, those prisoners that the government never released or whose bodies 
have not been found are presumed dead.  At a time when the military was openly 
repressing all civil opposition, women began to meet in the open in protest, in spite of 
danger to their persons. 
Argentina had an unusually high amount of human rights activism, especially 
protests and organizations of women, relative to other military regimes and newly 
democratizing states in Latin America (Sikkink 2008).  As I have mentioned, the Mothers 
of the Plaza de Mayo are the best-known Argentine women’s human rights organization 
(Wilson 1993).  Due to (and in spite of) rampant abuses by the government, Argentine 
women took to the streets in large numbers to demand change.  The Mothers of the Plaza 
de Mayo (and related women’s organizations) gathered weekly to shame the 
government’s actions and plead for information on their missing children2.  Made up 
originally of the mothers of victims of politically motivated disappearances, this 
organization marched weekly near the capital wearing their distinctive white hoods to 
demand information on their children’s whereabouts.  From 1976 to the mid-80s, during 
the military regime and the democratization period, organized human rights protest from 
                                                 
2 One offshoot organization still meets every Thursday at the Plaza. 
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the Mothers (and other groups) was overwhelming.  Under similar conditions of civil 
strife, similar groups of mothers began protesting in Chile, Uruguay, Guatemala, and 
several other Latin American states.  In each case, it was the disappearance of a loved one 
that motivated these women to form groups, take action, and protest against the 
government’s repressive practices. 
These cases demonstrate that repression by the state can be a powerful motivation 
for protests.  When the state engages in repression, as it did in the examples previously 
discussed, this inflicts harm on victims’ families, their friends, and their communities.  
This harm constitutes a meaningful grievance against the state among those connected to 
the victims of repression.  This grievance motivates some people to take action, 
specifically by protesting against the state.  Given that women are likely represented in 
any large social group, and make up roughly half of any given population, women are at 
least as likely to be affected by repression enacted by the state, and so women should be 
incentivized to protest when the state uses repression, in much the same way that we 
expect other protests to form when the state is repressive.  In this sense, I expect that 
women’s protests are motivated by repression in much the same way other forms of 
protest can be responses to repression. 
H1 – Women’s protests will be more frequent when the government is repressive 
than when the government is not repressive. 
Wheras contemporary and historical evidence suggests that women react to state 
repression with protest, in the same way that general protests often arise from state 
repression (Davenport 2007, Moore 1998), the broader literature on the relationship 
between protest and dissent suggests further qualifications.  The long line of literature on 
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the “repression-dissent nexus” has generally found a strong relationship between 
repression from the state and protest among citizens (Regan and Henderson 2002, Moore 
2000).  However, these works suggest that the relationship between repression and 
dissent is more complex than the historical evidence I have considered so far.  
Specifically, these works find that state repression can both motivate, and be motivated 
by, protests (Moore 2000).  Also, though repression can anger some citizens and cause 
them to protest, but repression might also deter citizens from protesting.  In other words, 
repression and dissent are endogenous.  This suggests caution while interpreting any 
observed relationship between state repression and women’s protests.  Because protests 
and repression are codetermined, empirical analyses may overestimate the statistical 
significance and substantive effect of repression on women’s protests. 
However, this possibility is not a huge concern for this particular research for a 
number of reasons.  The first is that repression and dissent are interconnected, but the 
specific pathway from state repression to protests is multidirectional:  sometimes 
repression motivates protests, but sometimes repression deters protests, and sometimes no 
effect is observed (Davenport 2007).  On the opposite side, however, the relationship is 
unidirectional:  states generally respond to protests with repression (Davenport 2007).  In 
fact, this relationship is so consistently observed, it is known as the “Law of Coercive 
Responsiveness” (Davenport 2007).  This is because the state values quiescence, or 
peaceful obedience, by the general public.  My research focuses explicitly on the first 
pathway, and argues that for women’s protests in particular, we should observe protests 
in response to repression.  If repression by the state actually deters protests by women, 
this would only reduce the likelihood of observing the expected positive relationship 
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between repression and women’s protests, rather than increase the likelihood of a Type I 
error.    
If we are to take seriously Davenport’s (2007) suggestion to begin theorizing to 
explain the imbalanced findings about repression causing dissent, then this dissertation 
represents a step in that direction by examining the types of protests which arise from 
dissent, focusing on women’s protests in particular.  In particular, the next section 
unpacks the effects of different repressive tactics on protests by different groups.  I argue 
that women’s protests have a distinct relationship to state repression as compared to 
general protests. 
 The second reason the endogeneity problem is not particularly problematic is that 
gender stereotypes influence states’ perceptions of political threats.  In particular, as I 
elaborate on further in the next section, states typically do not view women as a salient 
political threat.  Though women can and do face repressive retribution from the state, it is 
far more likely that women protestors will be ignored by the state.  I will leave this 
observation for now, but I return to it later in the next step of my argument about why 
women might protest as women. 
Women Protest Forced Disappearances 
Having established the general expectation that the more repressive a state is, the 
more women will protest, I now turn to theorizing about why women choose to protest 
“as women”, or not, at decision point 3 (Figure 3).  To explain this decision in the context 
of state repression, here I argue that repressive practices are gendered, that as a 
consequence of this, the effects of repression are gendered, and thus protests motivated 
by repression are likely to be gendered as well.  Looking specifically at the state’s use of 
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forced disappearances, I show that women are less likely to be targeted by the state, but 
are still victimized by the loss of a family member or friend, which motivates women to 
protest when the state uses forced disappearances.  Women consequently use their gender 
identity as a shield to minimize the danger to themselves of facing backlash from the 
state for protesting, and thus are able to effectively mobilize as women, while broader 
protests including both men and women would likely be vulnerable to additional 
repression. 
Gendered Repression and Gendered Dissent 
The Argentine case, along with many others, saw women taking to the streets 
even as the regime was very repressive.  This begs the question:  why do women, in 
particular, protest when the government is highly repressive?  In this section, I argue that 
state repression is gendered in practice, and as a consequence of this, has gendered 
effects.  In particular, when the state uses repression, it does so in ways that affect women 
and men differently.  Due to the different effects that repression has on women and men, 
women’s reactions to repression, such as protesting, are different from the reactions of 
men.  Certain repressive tactics are more likely to be associated with women’s protests.  
Here I focus on the use of forced disappearances, in particular, as there is clear historical 
and contemporary evidence demonstrating gender’s role in shaping who is targeted for 
disappearance and how victims and survivors respond.  In this section I build upon both 
grievance (Gurr 1968, 1970) and political opportunity structure (Tilly 1978, Costain 
1992) models of protest to argue that forced disappearances can serve as a gendered 
grievance, directly motivating protests by survivors, but that the actual practice of forced 
disappearances present a gendered opportunity structure for mobilization. 
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While both men and women could be motivated to protest by disappearances, 
women will be more likely to protest when the government uses disappearances, and men 
will not be more likely to do so, for three reasons.  First, disappearances are gendered in 
their targeting, namely that typically men are victims of the practice and women were not 
targeted as often, thus increasing the perceived cost of protest for men and reducing the 
relative cost for women.  Secondarily, women have unique advantages for mobilization in 
the face of political disappearances relative to men.  Due to the “shield” of their roles as 
wives and mothers (Navarro 1989, Schirmer 1989), women are able to protest when men 
cannot. 
What is Forced Disappearance? 
Forced disappearance3 is a particular type of repression that is particularly 
egregious compared to other types of repression.  According to international law, forced 
disappearance refers specifically to  
“… the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by 
agents of the State … followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of 
liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, 
which place such a person outside the protection of the law.” (“International 
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance” 
2006). 
                                                 
3 Also called “enforced disappearance” or simply “disappearance”.  In this dissertation, as 
in other documents describing the process, “forced disappearance”, “enforced 
disappearance”, and “disappearance” all refer to the exact same repressive practice.   
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Forced disappearances were in many ways a repressive “innovation” of the Argentine 
junta (Sikkink 2008)4.  While other regimes, like the Third Reich, had long practiced 
disappearances of political rivals, the Argentine military developed a massive and well-
organized state apparatus to disappear people.  It was Argentine human rights activists in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s that first coined the phrase “to disappear someone” to 
describe the clandestine political kidnappings used by the military regime (Sikkink 2011, 
2008). 
 However, forced disappearance does not usually entail merely the violation of 
habeas corpus, even though that on its own is deeply troubling.  Typically, those targeted 
by forced disappearance are actually subjected to a combination of other, concurrent 
violations of their physical integrity rights.  In practice, forced disappearances essentially 
represent a combination of all three of the other types of repression.  Forced 
disappearance is a subtype of unlawful imprisonment, often politically motivated and 
used against supposed “dissidents” (Navarro 1989).  Once taken by the state, many 
victims of forced disappearance are tortured (Dewhirst and Kapur 2015).  Nearly all those 
targeted are eventually killed.  Given these patterns, it is arguably true that forced 
disappearance represents the worst possible physical integrity violation.  Given the 
severity of treatment of victims, understanding the effects of forced disappearances is 
especially important, even as the practice has declined over time, and especially given the 
                                                 
4 Other repressive practices associated with forced disappearances in Argentina were also 
new, such as taking the babies of pregnant disappeared women, falsifying their identities, 
and adopting them into military families (Sikkink 2008).  Out of an estimated five 
hundred babies taken in this way by the regime, only fifty had been found by their 
genetic families as of 1993 (Wilson 1993).   
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recent spread of the practice to countries like Syria (Amnesty International 2017) and the 
Philippines (Bautista 2018). 
Forced Disappearances as a Grievance against the State 
Theories about protests and contentious mobilization often emphasize the role of 
grievances that motivate certain people to act against the status quo (Gurr 1968, 1970, 
Davies 1962).  These arguments posit that government actions, particularly repression, 
act as a major motivation for civil unrest (Carey 2006, Moore 1998)   Disappearances, 
like other forms of repression, can indeed serve as a grievance that motivates survivors to 
act.  This is because forced disappearances have particularly negative outcomes on 
relatives of the disappeared, and thus may motivate them to action (Navarro 1989, 
Sikkink 2008).   
One unique factor about disappearance tactics relative to other repressive actions 
are the targets of this repression (Sikkink 2008).  Most of the victims of this type of 
repression are young:  in Argentina, over 80 percent of the victims were under 35 
(Sikkink 2008).  Recent accounts of both Colombia (Haugaard 2011) and Mexico 
(Human Rights Watch 2014) suggest that victims there have also been relatively young.  
In part because of the relative youth of victims, the use of disappearance tactics can have 
particularly awful psychological effects on the families of victims (Sikkink 2008).  
Because victims are typically young, very often the parents of the victim are still alive 
and are left to try to piece together what happened to their child.   
Jelin (1995) characterizes the loss of a disappeared child as “uncertain harm”:  the 
child is missing but family members do not know for certain whether they are alive or 
dead.  This “ambiguous loss” is similar to that experienced by families of military 
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personnel who are missing in action, and is the most stressful type of grieving that people 
face (Boss 1999), making it difficult for family members to move on with their lives 
(Sikkink 2008).  In instances when the whereabouts of a family member are known (for 
instance, with “ordinary” political imprisonment) and/or their death is confirmed, this 
ambiguity is absent.  By contrast, in the face of the uncertainty caused by disappearances, 
many family members of the disappeared in Argentina believed their children might be 
alive and suffering, and this possibility motivated their activism because protesting could 
potentially lead to the safe return of their children (Navarro 1989).  Families turned to 
activism as a coping mechanism to help deal with their uncertainty and grief when family 
members went missing (Sikkink 2008). 
H2 – Women’s protests will be more frequent when the government uses forced 
disappearance as a repressive tactic than if the government does not use forced 
disappearance.   
However, it is important to note that the pain of the loss of a child through forced 
disappearance is universal to men and women, mothers and fathers, and so we might 
expect both women’s protests and broader social protests when the state uses 
disappearances.  Historically, however, this has not been the case, and primarily women 
have been most active in protesting when the state uses forced disappearances (Navarro 
1989, Schirmer 1989).  This is due to two factors in the way in which forced 
disappearance has been practiced by the state, which I elaborate on in the next section.  
First, the practice of disappearances is gendered, and men are more likely to be 
disappeared than women are.  Second, women have the unique opportunity to utilize their 
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identity as mothers and wives as a “shield” to provide space for them to protest (Navarro 
1989, Schirmer 1989), which men cannot do.   
Gendered Targeting of Forced Disappearances 
In addition to grievance-focused theories of protest, other works emphasize the 
opportunity structure within which individuals operate.  These theories focus on the 
opportunity to protest, rather than the motivation of a protest (Eisinger 1973, Tilly 1978, 
Kitschelt 1986, Hirsch 1990, Costain 1992, Tarrow 1994, della Porta and Tarrow 2005, 
2012, Chenoweth and Ulfelder 2015, Meyer 2004).  In other words, whether or not we 
see protest depends, in part. on how much the state will tolerate dissent.  When deciding 
whether to protest, individuals estimate how likely the state is to repress them for taking 
to the streets, based in part on how the state has reacted to dissent in the past 
(Cunningham and Beaulieu 2010, Lichbach 1987). 
The opportunity structure arguments are a major point of departure for my 
argument:  While men and women alike feel the grief and motivation to protest caused 
directly by the disappearance of a loved one, the actual practice of disappearance alters 
the political opportunity structure in a gendered way, for two reasons.  First, as I outline 
in this section, the state typically does not use disappearance against women.  Second, as 
I outline in the next section, women have the ability to politicize their gender identity, 
and protest “as women”, when the state uses disappearances than otherwise.  Due to these 
two factors, women actually have more space to mobilize and protest when the state uses 
disappearances than men do.   
Disappearances are gendered in their targeting:  men are more likely to be 
disappeared than women are.  Historical narratives from Argentina and other countries 
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(Navarro 1989, Schirmer 1989), recent journalistic accounts (Human Rights Watch 
2014), as well as available statistics on the genders of victims of forced disappearance all 
support the assertion that women were less likely to be disappeared than men.  The UN 
reports that most reported cases of forced disappearance are of men, with roughly 70% to 
94% of the disappeared being male, shown in Table 1 (Dewhirst and Kapur 2015).  These 
gender breakdowns are available primarily in the pre-democratization periods of open 
civil conflict in the selected countries.  These countries were selected due to data 
availability:  gender breakdowns of victims were not available in other cases (Dewhirst 
and Kapur 2015).    
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Table 1:  Estimated Percentage of Victims by Gender, Selected Countries 
Country Women Men 
Argentina  30%  70%  
Chile  6%  94%  
Guatemala  12%  78%  
Peru  15%  85%  
South Africa 10% 90% 
Note:  Table adapted from Dewhirst and Kapur (2015). 
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Also, consider evidence from the partial list of names of the disappeared in by the 
“Proyectos Disapperacedos”, an NGO affiliated with FEDEFAM5.  The full list of names 
of victims in both Argentina and Brazil is included in Appendix C.  These lists are 
obviously only a small sample of the total number of victims of forced disappearances in 
those countries, but using these lists allows us to to gather some baseline information 
about who was targeted by the regime.   
Their list of victims in Argentina includes 1,898 total victims.  I examine only the 
first names listed, as those are most informative about the person’s gender.  In Spanish 
speaking cultures, feminine middle names are fairly common – many men have Maria as 
a middle name, for example.  The fifteen most common first names in the list, in order of 
the number of appearances, were María, which appeared 81 times, followed by Carlos 
and Jorge, both at 74 times each respectively, Juan at 72 times, José at 63 times, Luis at 
50, Eduardo at 48, Miguel at 40, Roberto at 35, Ricardo, at 31, Daniel and Julio at 30 
each, and Hugo at 28 times.  Indeed, if we look at the 45 most common names, which I 
have coded as male or female, we see that there were 928 male victims in the list but only 
212 females, meaning that men were roughly 4.4 times more likely that women to appear 
in the list.   
In addition, since many Argentine names are Spanish in origin, and Spanish is a 
Romance language with gendered nouns, it is possible to capture, loosely, the gender 
composition of the list by checking for name endings.  Names ending in “-o” are typically 
assigned to males, and names ending in “-a” are more frequently given to women (though 
                                                 
5 Acronym for Federación Latinoamericana de Asociaciones de Familiares de Detenidos-
Desaparecidos, an organization that works to end the practice of forced disappearances. 
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not always).  Here, again, we see that male names appear more commonly in this list of 
victims, with 607 names ending in “-o” but only 476 first names ending in “-a”.   
The list for Brazil is much smaller, including only 125 names.  However, it is still 
valuable information to analyze.  In this list, among all the first names which appear more 
than once, the most common name is José, which appears 9 times, followed by Antonio 
at 7 times, Paulo at 6, João at 5, Maria at 3, followed by Daniel, Joel, Luis, Orlando, 
Pedro, Rui, and Walter all appearing at 2 times each, respectively.  This suggests that 
male names appear roughly 16.7 times more frequently in this list than female names.  
While Portuguese naming conventions differ slightly from Spanish, generally the rule of 
“-o” as masculine and “-a” as feminine still applies.  I find that names in this list end in “-
o” 52 times, but in “-a” only 14 times.   
Taken as a whole, all the available evidence on the gender of victims of forced 
disappearances suggests that the state does not target women as often as men, at least 
with the use of forced disappearance.  In part because many of the direct targets of 
disappearance are male, many of the political effects of disappearance are gendered as 
well.  Men are taken more frequently, and women are thus more often left behind to piece 
together what has happened.   
Since women know that the state is less likely to target them, they would see this 
context as an opportunity to protest with lower personal risks, increasing their likelihood 
of protest (Tilly 1978).  In other words, in states where forced disappearances are 
common, the repressive tactics used by the state change the political opportunity structure 
in a gendered way, encouraging women to protest but not encouraging men.  In fact, one 
member of the Madres articulated just this, saying “You have to leave.” to men who 
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wished to accompany the mothers, “If there are only women, the police will not dare to 
intervene, but if you come they will not hesitate to take you away” (quoted in Bousquet 
1983, Navarro 1989).  This affords women’s groups, in particular, a unique opportunity 
to mobilize in the face of such repressive tactics.  Unlike general protests, which would 
usually include both men and women, women’s protests are less likely to be met with 
repression.  Thus, women and women’s groups may be able to protest when men cannot.   
H3 – Women’s protests will be more frequent when the government uses forced 
disappearance, but other protests will not be more frequent.. 
Women’s Participate in Protests in Repressive Contexts 
Finally, I wish to turn to examining decision point 4 from Figure 3, wherein 
citizens decide whether to join a protest or not.  I argue that in repressive contexts, 
particularly situations where the state is using forced disappearances, women’s gender 
identity constitutes a valuable political resource that can enable and incentivize women to 
join protests.  This means that the gender gap in participation between women and men 
actually narrows under repressive contexts. 
As social movement theorists often point out, political opportunities for protest do 
not simply exist in the abstract.  Activists must also perceive and/or construct those 
opportunities for themselves (Della Porta and Tarrow 2012, 2005, Tarrow 2004, 
Banaszak 1996).  Here, too, there is reason to believe that forced disappearance changes 
the political context in ways women, in particular, can utilize.  The military regime in 
Argentina used the ideal of the traditional family as a central metaphor, and the women of 
the Plaza saw this as an opportunity to turn that message around against the state 
(Navarro 1989).  They subverted the regime’s message by exposing its hypocrisy in 
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splitting up families.  The Mothers used the nuclear family and motherhood in its 
messages and public appeals (Jelin 2004).  When the state uses forced disappearances 
women also have unique opportunities to emphasize their position in society as women, 
wives, and mothers (Mooney 2007, Navarro 1989, Schirmer 1989).  In other words, 
women can organize as a group strategically. 
While much prior research focuses on the negative effects of gender stereotypes, 
under certain circumstances, popular perceptions of women can also work to their 
advantage (Barnes and Beaulieu 2016, Navarro 1989).  Because of the ability to “shield” 
themselves by politicizing their roles as wives and mothers, women were able to protest 
when men could not (Navarro 1989, Schirmer 1989).  Even in the context of mass 
repression under military regimes, women in Argentina (Sikkink 2008), Chile (Noonan 
1995, Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux 1998), and other countries still took to the streets to 
demand information on their children.  This historical reality both challenges and 
qualifies the political opportunity structure argument (Sikkink 2008):  women mobilized 
in spite of the fact that there was little to no chance for success in changing the regime’s 
behavior.  Critically, in a repressive context, these groups organized “as women” 
strategically, and mobilized particularly as mothers, focused on the biological family and 
the bond between mother and child (Sikkink 2008).   
In part due to their ability to organize “as women” (Navarro 1989), and thanks to 
the international attention to their cause (Mooney 2007), the state could not fully repress 
women and women’s groups the way it could repress more general dissent.  At a time 
when thousands of men were disappearing, the government took only a small number 
from the Mothers group.  While disappearances of women did indeed happen, they were 
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not nearly as frequent as one would expect given the widespread use of the practice.  In 
the face of political disappearances then, both because of their centrality to families that 
the regime purported to value, and because of international attention to their cause, 
women had better opportunities to oppose the regime openly than men had. 
 Heretofore, I have primarily discussed women as a group.  In other words, to 
borrow from rational choice terminology, I have made a “unitary actor” assumption about 
women.  In reality women come from all different economic classes, races and 
ethnicities, social positions, geographies, and so on.  Indeed, not all women are wives or 
mothers, nor are they always perceived as such.  However, the assumption of women as a 
group is warranted by my argument for a number of reasons.  While not all women are 
wives or mothers, only women can be wives or mothers, at least according to the 
traditional gender roles typically found in the region.  Secondarily, when women are 
protesting, it would be difficult or impossible for an outside observer to distinguish which 
women are, in fact, wives or mothers, and which are not.  Thus, while not all women are 
wives or mothers, even those women who do not have children or husbands can 
potentially join a protest of wives and mothers.  Recall, for example, the reasoning of 
Maria Antonieta Lugo, who was willing to join in a protest by local housewives because 
she herself had male relatives the same age as those who had disappeared (Stevenson and 
Sherman 2014).  Even those without children could be persuaded by a similar logic, and 
would be perceived similarly to other women in the protest by an observer even if they 
did not have children. 
While my earlier hypotheses focus on country level dynamics, ultimately they 
require individual women to recognize and capitalize upon the political environment in 
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which they find themselves.  When the state does not use forced disappearance, in 
general, women do not typically participate in politics at the same level as men (Córdova 
and Rangel 2016, Beauregard 2013, Kittilson 2016, Espinal and Zhao 2015, Gallego 
2015, Barnes and Burchard 2012, Coffé and Bolzendahl 2010, Desposato and Norrander 
2009, Zetterberg 2009, Inglehart and Norris 2003, Verba, Burns, and Schlozman 1997).  
Consider, for example, that women who had never been involved in politics prior to the 
disappearance of their children originally formed the Mothers group in Argentina 
(Navarro 1989).  In sum, I expect that during “politics as usual” there is a gender gap 
between men and women’s participation, and women are less likely to take part in 
protest.   
H4 – During times when the government is not very repressive, women will be 
less likely to participate in protests compared to men..   
However, when the state makes use of forced disappearance, it is likely that women will 
recognize their lower risk for speaking out, their ability to organize as women, and the 
additional space that this tactic can afford them to protest.  Consequently, individual 
women will be more likely to protest when the government uses disappearances. 
H5 – Women will be more likely to participate in protests when the government 
uses disappearances, whereas men will not be more likely to participate in 
protests under those conditions. 
 Conclusions 
 In this chapter, I have laid out my argument about the relationship between 
women’s protests and state practices of repression.  I have argued that repression by the 
state is a key motivator for many protests by women, and that the practice of repression is 
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gendered in meaningful ways.  Due to the influence of gender on how states target 
repression, I argue that society reacts in a gendered way.  Forced disappearance, in 
particular, targets men more frequently than women.  Due to this, protests under 
conditions where the state is disappearing citizens are more likely to be framed in 
gendered terms, and women’s protests are more likely, while general protest should not 
be more frequent in those conditions.  Finally, due to women’s increased safety from 
outright repression when the state uses disappearance, women are more likely to 
participate in protests under those conditions.   
 Table 2 outlines my hypotheses, making clear what the comparison group 
expectation is for each.  H1 is that women should protest repression, and in this sense, I 
argue that women’s protests are similar to general protests.  H2 is that women’s protests  
should be more frequence when the state uses disappearance.  H3 is that general protests 
should not be more likely when the state uses disappearance, because of how they are 
targeted in a gendered way.  H4 is that under non-repressive conditions, women should 
be less likely to protest, and H5 is that women will be more likely to protest under 
repressive conditions, compared to men. 
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Table 2:  Hypotheses  
  
Women’s Protests Comparison 
H1 Women’s protests will be more frequent 
when the state is repressive 
Women’s protests are similar to other 
protests 
H2 Women’s protests will be more frequent 
when the state uses disappearance 
(See H3) 
H3 (See H2) General protests are not more frequent 
H4 Women will be less likely to participate 
in protest when the state does not use 
disappearance 
Men are more likely to participate in 
protests when the state does not use 
disappearance 
H5 Women will be more likely to 
participate in protest when the state uses 
disappearance 
Men are not more likely to participate 
in protest when the state does not use 
disappearance 
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Chapter 3 – Empirics:  Women Protest Repression 
In this chapter, I present empirical tests of my first major hypothesis, namely that 
women’s protests are frequently motivated by repressive actions undertaken by the state.  
I first present a test of H1 on a global sample of states from 1990-2012.  Secondarily, at 
the end of the chapter, I present a number of robustness tests, including an analysis of 
regional variations. 
As a reminder, the hypothesis tested in this chapter is as follows: 
H1 – Women will protest more when the government is repressive than when the 
government is not repressive. 
Research Design 
To test my first hypothesis, I utilize a time-series cross-sectional dataset of 
women’s protests and covariates.  These data cover the 1990 to 2012 period.  
Geographically, these data cover all states recognized by the US Department of State, 
whose reports are used to generate human rights violations data (Cingranelli and Richards 
2010).  The unit of analysis is country-year (e.g. “Chile-1995” is one unit). 
My primary dependent variable to test H1 is a count of women’s protests in a 
given year, which ranges from 0 to 205 (data from Murdie and Peksen 2014).  Given the 
nature of the dependent variable as a “count” of discrete events, the primary modelling 
strategy used in this chapter (and the following chapter) is negative binomial regression 
(King 1989). Negative binomial regression is a statistical modelling strategy used for 
modeling a dependent variable which accounts for the non-linearity typically found in 
count data (King 1989).  In particular, negative binomial regression accounts for the fact 
that count data is bounded by a floor at zero (a discrete event cannot occur fewer than 0 
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times).  This is preferable to a linear approach, like ordinary least squares (OLS) because 
OLS becomes inefficient, inconsistent, and biased when it is applied to count data.   
Additionally, negative binomial models account for two of the most common 
issues with another common method for modelling count data, the Poisson regression.  
The first is that unlike a Poisson model, negative binomial approaches account for over-
dispersion – a situation in which the variance of the dependent variable is greater than the 
mean.  The second is that Poisson approaches assume independence of the dependent 
variable over time.  Given that the dependent variable in question is over-dispersed, 
negative binomial is more appropriate than Poisson.  Secondarily, the dependent variable 
is very likely to be dependent, rather than independent over time (one protest in a given 
year probably increases the likelihood of more protests occurring within that year).  
Additional testing on the dependent variable did not reveal significant zero-inflation.  
Zero-inflation is a situation in which there are an unusual number of non-events in the 
dependent variable, which are zeroes in count data, occur and can bias estimates 
(essentially similar to the problem of modeling a “rare event” in a logistic regression). 
Dependent Variable  
The data on women’s protest come from Murdie and Peksen (2014):  prior to 
2014, no comprehensive cross-national data on women’s protests existed.  They utilize 
data from the Integrated Data for Events Analysis database (IDEA6) (Bond et al. 2003), 
which is an automated coding of all events in the Reuters Global News Service, 
organized into discrete “events” with information on “who did what to whom” for every 
                                                 
6 Note this is a distinct organization from the International Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance, also called IDEA. 
59 
 
recorded event (Murdie and Peksen 2014, King and Lowe 2003).  For further discussion 
of coding procedures (e.g. “why Reuters?”) see Murdie and Peksen (2014), p. 6.  Prior 
work using this dataset has focused on violent and/or nonviolent protests (Bhasin 2008, 
Murdie and Bhasin 2011).  In this chapter, I use a count of all women’s protests.  This 
value ranges from zero (i.e. no protests occurred in that year) in 1,890 cases to 205 
protests in one case7, with an average of about 5.2 protests in a given country-year.   
Independent Variables 
My theory predicts that women will protest under conditions of government 
repression.  To measure the independent variable of interest, I use the Cingranelli and 
Richards (CIRI; 2010) Human Rights Data.  Using the CIRI data is appropriate because 
CIRI allows me to disaggregate their index and examine the impact of particular types of 
repressive actions, which is not possible with other human rights data (such as PTS, see 
Cingranelli and Richards 2010, Wood and Gibney 2010).  The ability to break down 
repression into its component practices is important for my theory, and critical for the 
empirical tests I conduct in the next chapter.  A descriptive breakdown of the types of 
repression measured is presented in Figure 4.  As you can see, torture has been the the 
most common repressive tactic employed by states, with roughly 70% of all states still 
using the tactic in 2010.  Political imprisonment is also a commonly used type of 
repression, with roughly 70% of states seeing use of this tactic in 1990.  However, over 
time the use of this particular type of repression has declined dramatically, with only 
about 55% of states seeing use of the tactic in 2014.  Extrajudicial killings are 
consistently used less frequently than imprisonment or torture across time, but 
                                                 
7 The United States in 1998. 
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nonetheless represent extreme disrespect for human rights when they are practiced in a 
given state.  Finally, forced disappearance is the least utilized, but arguably most severe, 
form of repression.   Its use has declined considerably over time, with about 58% of states 
using the tactic in 1990 but less than 45% of states using it in 2010. 
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Figure 4:  Prevalence of Repression for All Countries by Repression Type 
 
Notes:  Data on repression types comes from CIRI (Cingranelli and Richards 2010).  For 
visualization purposes, a country is coded as experiencing a type of repression in a given 
year if CIRI reported that a type of repression occurred “frequently” in a given country 
for a given year, whereas a state is coded as not experiencing a repression type if CIRI 
reports that type of repression only “occasionally” occurred, or did not occur, in a given 
year. 
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To test H1, I employ the additive Physical Integrity Scale.  This variable is an 
ordinal scale that ranges from zero to eight.  I have rescaled the variable so that a score of 
eight represents the “most repressive” government practices and zero represents “least 
repressive”, for ease of interpretation.   I do not lag this variable, as protests are generally 
a rapid response to ground conditions, while all other time-varying covariates are 
typically lagged by one year.  This does lead to concerns for the possibility of 
endogeneity, but I conduct additional tests to this end shown in the Appendix, and do not 
find evidence of a reciprocal relationship. 
Figure 5 shows the observed average number of women’s protests at varying 
levels of state repression.  In other words, the graph shows a simple bivariate regression 
“line of best fit” between protests and repression.  As you can see, the raw data suggests 
that my expectation is supported.  Without including any controls, we observe that 
women’s protests do seem to increase in frequency as a state becomes more repressive.  
However, we must account for the role of other variables that may affect this 
relationship’s strength and significance.  Thus I discuss the control variables employed, 
and in the next section report a full model with controls. 
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Figure 5:  Relationship between Women’s Protests and Repression 
 
Notes:  Figure plots the average observed number of women’s protests at varying 
observed levels of state repression.  Controls are not included. 
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Controls 
As mentioned earlier, Murdie and Peksen (2014) offer a global analysis of 
women’s protest based on the three major theories of political mobilization:  grievances, 
resource mobilization, and political process.  Grievance theories suggest that discontent 
with the current political system leads to collective dissent (Davies 1962, Gurr 1968).  
Thus, I want to control for whether the state respects women’s political equality (Murdie 
and Peksen 2014).  I control for this relationship by including the CIRI measure of 
women’s political rights in my models.  This scale ranges from zero (women’s political 
rights are not guaranteed in law or practice) to three (women’s political rights are 
guaranteed by law and are respected in practice).  I expect a negative relationship:  high 
respect for women’s political rights should decrease the need for women to protest. 
Resource mobilization theories focus instead on the ability of groups to mobilize 
(rather than their motivation for doing so).  Access to resources, such as financial and 
organizational support, reduces the cost of mobilization and thus increases the likelihood 
of protest (Tilly 1978, McCarthy and Zald 1977, Bell et al. 2013).  To account for this 
relationship, I control for the number of women’s INGOs (from Cole, 2013), and I expect 
a positive relationship here: more women’s INGOs should ease the cost of collective 
mobilization and lead to higher levels of protest.  As a secondary measure, I use women’s 
labor force participation.  This measure is the percent of the total labor force that is 
female, and I again expect a positive relationship.   
Political process theories focus on the opportunity to succeed in a political goal.  
Mobilization depends on a favorable political environment:  individuals must have some 
confidence they could succeed, and the government must be somewhat tolerant of dissent 
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(Costain 1992, see also Tilly 1978, and Lipset 1963).  Historical evidence suggests this 
latter qualifier may not hold in the Latin American context:  women could and did 
organize in spite of massive repression from the government in Argentina and several 
other countries.  This is less problematic for my analysis because of the timeframe, as all 
Latin American states had democratized to some degree prior to 1990.  In order to 
capture the effects of openness of the political system, I include a control for level of 
democracy (Polity IV).  Given there may be a “ceiling effect” (Murdie and Peksen 2014), 
I test for robustness with a squared term (See Appendix A), and do not find substantively 
different results.   
Additionally, I include a dichotomous measure that captures whether a given year 
contained a executive election.  Elections have the potential to serve as “focal points” for 
the opposition (Beaulieu 2014), and represent a period of political openness in which real 
change is possible (Howard and Roessler 2006).  Thus, I expect that high-profile 
elections should exhibit higher levels of protest.  From 1990 to 2012, a total of 432 
executive elections occurred in the world.  The data for election years comes from the 
Database of Political Institutions (Beck 2001).   
I control for other contextual factors that might be important.  The most obvious 
are economic controls.  Wealth, development, and inequality are important for 
determining the level of protests we see in many contexts (Brancati 2013).  Inequality 
may lead to economic grievances, increasing protests.  Wealth and development have less 
clear-cut expectations:  more wealth could provide more resources with which to protest, 
but also remove cause for doing so.  I control for these with the logged GDP of a country 
in a given year, the logged GDP per Capita, growth in GDP from the previous year.   
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Gender quotas have been on the rise across the globe since Argentina became the 
first to adopt such a quota in 1993 (Jones 2009, Barnes 2012).  Gender quotas could 
represent a signal from the government that women’s participation in politics is valued, 
encouraging them to mobilize.  Thus, I control for the presence of a legislative gender 
quota with a dichotomous variable taking a value of one for every year in which a quota 
was in effect, and zero otherwise.  This variable comes from Cole (2013). 
I also control for women’s level of tertiary education.  To the extent that we can 
assume women are rational “unitary” actors, they would prefer to get their needs met 
without having to take to the streets, because protesting is costly (see Beaulieu 2014).  
One typical explanation for bargaining failure are information problems (Fearon 1995).  
In low information environments, women and the state cannot send clear signals about 
their preferences.  As information increases, women are more able to use “regular” 
channels to get information to the government.  Following Beaulieu (2014), I proxy this 
“information environment” by including a control for education.  While education 
provides resources for political participation (Verba, Brady, and Schlozman 1995), I 
expect it to encourage more “regular participation” like voting and direct women away 
from protesting.  I use the enrollment rates of women in tertiary education from the 
World Bank as my measure.  As education levels increase, protest should decrease. 
Given that the protest data are based on media reports, I also want to control for 
potential bias from news sources.  Some countries may simply have more news stories 
written about them due to their geopolitical importance, news audience taste, or some 
other unobserved factors.  To control for this possibility, I include a measure of media 
bias, which captures the number of reports (in thousands) about a given country in a 
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given year.  This should reduce the possible bias towards more protests being reported in 
more news-saturated countries.  Given that the data are created from Reuters’ reports, and 
the presence of foreign media has also been theorized to increase protest diffusion (see 
Kern 2011), this control is especially necessary. 
Finally, protests are likely to be auto-correlated.  In other words, it is quite likely 
that the protests we see in a given year are related to the protests seen in the previous 
year.  As such, I include a control for the number of women’s protests in the previous 
year for each country (i.e. I include a lagged version of the dependent variable as an 
independent variable).  I expect a positive relationship here:  protests in one year should 
positively predict protests in the following year.   
Results 
 Table 3 reports results for testing my first hypothesis.  Recall that H1 is that 
women will protest against state repression.  I find support for this hypothesis:  in both 
models, state repression (as measured by CIRI’s physical integrity scale, inverted) has a 
positive and significant impact on the number of women’s protests.  To show this effect 
visually, in Figure 6, I graph the predicted number of women’s protests by the level of 
state repression (based on Model 2).  As the state moves from no repression to the highest 
level of repression, the predicted number of protests goes from approximately 2 protests 
to anywhere in the range of 5-12 protests, an incredibly sizeable increase of at least 
double the number of protests.  In sum, I find strong statistical support in favor of H1. 
Table 3 shows inconsistent evidence that levels of democracy matter.  As 
expected, the level of women’s education is negatively, significantly related to the 
number of protests, suggesting that high information environments reduce overall levels 
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of contention.  I find that overall wealth predicts higher levels of protest, but that GDP 
per capita predicts lower levels of protest.  In robustness checks, I find that both 
relationships are non-linear:  increasing wealth and development both encourage 
participation, but past a certain point the effects reach a ceiling (see Appendix B).  I find 
no evidence that women’s political equality, NGOs, labor participation, or gender quotas 
matter for predicting women’s protests.  Given that most of those factors are relatively 
constant over time within countries, those null findings are not terribly surprising. 
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Table 3:  Negative Binomial Regression of Women's Protests on Repression 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Dependent Variable Women’s Protests Women’s Protests 
 
Independent Variables 
  
Repression 0.26*** 0.27*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Women’s Protests(t - 1) 0.04*** 0.03*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Women's Political Rights -0.07 0.03 
 (0.10) (0.11) 
Polity IV  -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Polity IV2 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Election Year -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Log GDP -0.04 -0.07 
 (0.67) (0.74) 
Log GDP2 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.02) 
Log GDP per Capita -0.06 -0.03 
 (0.09) (0.10) 
GDP Growth -0.02** -0.02** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Media Bias 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.00) 
Women's INGOs  0.01+ 
  (0.00) 
% Labor Force Female  -0.01 
  (0.01) 
Gender Quota  -0.21 
  (0.17) 
Female Tertiary Education  -0.00 
  (0.01) 
Observations 2725 2238 
Pseudo R2 0.17 0.14 
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.  Clustered standard errors in parentheses, two-
tailed tests.   
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Figure 6:  Women’s Protests by Level of Repression 
 
Notes:  Predictions based on Model 2.  
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Robustness Tests 
 I consider a number of additional checks and possible alternative explanations for 
my findings.  The first is that perhaps my findings are an artifact of the data I use to 
measure repression.  Though this is unlikely, I check for this possibility by using two 
different additional measures of repression to ensure that my findings are robust to 
different measurements.   
In particular, I use two measures from the Political Terror Scale (PTS) data to 
double-check my findings.  The PTS data provides two measures of repression that differ 
slightly because they are created from two sources:  State Department country reports, 
and Amnest International country reports (Wood and Gibney 2010).  Unlike CIRI, which 
uses both sources for one measure, PTS provides two separate measures, henceforth 
called the Amnesty Scale and the State Department Scale.  For both measures, the scales 
range from 0 to 5.  A score of 1 indicates a country “under a secure rule of law” wherein 
people are not imprisoned for their views and torture/political murders are rare.  A score 
of 2 indicates that there is some imprisonment for nonviolent political activity, but that 
torture and political murders are rare.  A score of 3 indicates extensive political 
imprisonment, execution and political murder may be common, and unlimited detetion is 
accepted.  A score of 4 indicates that the practices of the previous score are expanded to 
large numbers, and that murders, disappearances, and torture are part of life, but 
primarily only for politically active citizens.  Finally, a score of 5 indicates that these 
repressive practices are extended to the entire population. 
These measures differ from the similar CIRI repression scale in a few key ways.  
First, it does not disaggregate repression by type – there is only a general scale of how 
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repressive a state is, without data on specific state behaviors.  Unfortunately, this means I 
cannot use the PTS data for testing any hypoetheses except H1.  Second, the PTS data 
incorporates information about the scale of repression, whereas CIRI does not (Wood and 
Gibney 2010).  A higher score on the CIRI scale tells us that a state is practicing more 
types of repression, whereas a higher score in the PTS data tells us that a state is 
practicing repression against more people.  Thus, if my theory is correct, I should expect 
that the observed relationship between repression and women’s protests would be even 
stronger using the PTS measures, as they better capture the scope of repression.  Overall, 
however, both the CIRI and the two PTS measures of repression are highly correlated, as 
you can see in Table 4. 
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Table 4:  Correlation of Repression Measures 
 Physical Integrity 
Scale 
Amnesty Scale State Dept. Scale 
Physical Integrity 
Scale (CIRI) 
-   
Amnesty Scale (PTS) .7698 -  
State Dept. Scale 
(PTS) 
.8085 .8137 - 
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As you see in Table 5, my findings are quite robust to these measures of 
repression.  Whether I use the data generated from Amnesty International reports (as in 
Models A and B) or US State Department reports (Models C and D), I find that we 
observe far more women’s protests the more repressive the state is.  In fact, the most 
striking thing about my findings is that aside from autocorrelation (the lagged measure of 
women’s protests) and GDP growth, repression is the only significant predictor of 
women’s protests, suggesting that repression might motivate women’s protests more than 
any other country level factor. 
I represent these findings graphically in Figure 7.  As you can see, when the state 
is not very repressive, the expected number of women’s protests is around two for any 
given year.  However, at the highest levels of repression, the expected number of 
women’s protests increases dramatically to somewhere in the range of 8 to 12, a four-fold 
increase at minimum.  Repression remains an incredibly powerful predictor of women’s 
protests, regardless of which measure I use to capture it. 
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Table 5: Negative Binomial Regression of Women's Protests on Repression (PTS) 
 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Dependent Variable Women’s 
Protests 
Women’s 
Protests 
Women’s 
Protests 
Women’s 
Protests 
Independent Variables     
Repression (Amnesty, PTS) 0.52*** 0.52***   
 (0.06) (0.07)   
Repression (State Dep., PTS)   0.47*** 0.48*** 
   (0.06) (0.07) 
Women’s Protests(t - 1) 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Women's Political Rights -0.11 -0.01 -0.12 -0.02 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.09) (0.11) 
Polity IV  -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Polity IV2 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Election Year -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log GDP -0.17 -0.08 0.27 0.17 
 (0.63) (0.73) (0.68) (0.73) 
Log GDP2 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Log GDP per Capita -0.11 -0.07 -0.08 -0.05 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) 
GDP Growth -0.02** -0.02*** -0.01* -0.02** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Media Bias -0.00 -0.00 0.04+ 0.02+ 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) 
Women's INGOs  0.01  0.01+ 
  (0.00)  (0.00) 
% Labor Force Female  -0.01  -0.01+ 
  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Gender Quota  -0.19  -0.20 
  (0.16)  (0.16) 
Female Tertiary Education  -0.01  -0.01 
  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Observations 2395 1950 2701 2216 
Pseudo R2 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.  Clustered standard errors in parentheses, two-
tailed tests. 
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Figure 7:  Women’s Protest by Level of Repression, PTS Measures 
 
Note:  Predictions based on Model 4 and Model 6, respectively.  The predictions on the 
left use the repression scale based on Amnesty International reports from the Political 
Terror Scale (PTS, Wood and Gibney 2010).  The predictions on the right use the 
repression scale based on US State Department reports from the Political Terror Scale 
(PTS, Wood and Gibney 2010).    
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 In addition to measurement issues, we might also worry that this global approach 
to analysis is missing some of the important regional variations in the relationship 
between protest activity and repression.  As Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2007) point 
out, regions of the world have particular dynamics and processes that are important 
within those regions, therefore it is dangerous to assume causal hetereogeneity across 
regions without taking precautions, and secondarily, political developments in one 
country affect developments in nearby countries, leading to meaningful regional patterns 
that may not be global in scale.  In particular for this work, we might worry that the 
theoretical framework I employ only applies to one particular region (Latin America), as 
most of the cases I draw from are found in that region.  If the relationship observed is 
extremely strong, but only found in one region, a global analysis may still report a 
significant coefficient, masking the fact that only one region fits the expected pattern.   
In order to account for these possible pitfalls, I present in Table # analyses that fit 
my general model to specific regions.  In particular, I use the regions of the world and the 
inclusion rules for which countries fit into which region as they are defined by the World 
Bank (note that I do not run a model for the North American region, as it includes only 
two countries, Canada and the United States).  The regional groupings imployed are: 
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), Europe and Central Asia (ECA), East Asia and 
the Pacific (EAP), the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), South Asia (SA), and 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).  Given that I will use these regions again in later analyses, 
here I provide an inclusive list of the countries that fall within each region in Appendix 
A. 
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 In Table 6, I present these regional analyses.  As you can see, repression generally 
predicts women’s protests across regions, but the size and statistical significance of 
repression varies greatly from region to region.  In particular, no statistically significant 
relationship is observed between repression and women’s protests in South Asia.  This 
may indicate a meaningful regional distinction, but this might also be caused by the 
relatively fewer number of countries included within that region.  I return to this fact in 
the next chapter, dealing with repression types, in much more detail, but for now, I do not 
find that only a single region is completely responsible for driving my findings.  In 
conclusion, based on these robustness tests, I do not find any empirical cause for concern 
about the theoretical relationship I expected from H1:  I find fairly consistent evidence 
that women protest when the state is highly repressive, with the exception of South Asia. 
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Table 6: Negative Binomial Regression of Women's Protests by Repression (Regions) 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
Dependent 
Variable 
Women’s 
Protests 
Women’s 
Protests 
Women’s 
Protests 
Women’s 
Protests 
Women’s 
Protests 
Women’s 
Protests 
Region LAC EAP ECA MENA SA SSA 
Independent 
Variables 
      
Repression  0.20*** 0.09* 0.22*** 0.18** 0.18 0.28*** 
     (CIRI) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.14) (0.05) 
Women’s  0.05*** 0.03** 0.03*** 0.03** 0.02* 0.03 
  Protests(t - 1) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
Women's  -0.51* -0.09 -0.32 -0.26 0.54*** 0.06 
  Political  
  Rights 
(0.22) (0.23) (0.23) (0.22) (0.15) (0.18) 
Polity IV  -0.04* 0.04+ 0.03 0.04 -0.02 -0.11*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) 
Polity IV2 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.03** 0.01 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Election  -0.00 -0.21 -0.00** 0.12 0.95*** 0.01*** 
  Year (0.19) (0.26) (0.00) (0.33) (0.25) (0.00) 
Log GDP 2.90* 3.31** -2.88** 1.94 13.50*** -0.90 
 (1.42) (1.09) (1.07) (3.56) (3.01) (2.64) 
Log GDP2 -0.05+ -0.06** 0.06** -0.03 -0.27*** 0.03 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
Log GDP  -0.48** -0.26* 0.29 -0.29* -0.04 -0.35+ 
  per Capita (0.18) (0.11) (0.24) (0.14) (0.38) (0.18) 
GDP Growth 0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.03+ 0.09+ -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.01) 
Media Bias 0.15* 0.03* 0.01 0.30** 0.01 0.28* 
 (0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01) (0.13) 
Observations 437 300 778 298 120 740 
Pseudo R2 0.16 0.17 0.14 0.15 0.19 0.16 
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.  Clustered standard errors in parentheses, two-
tailed tests. 
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Chapter 4 – Empirics:  Women Protest Disappearances 
In this chapter, I provide empirical tests of H2 and H3, namely that women’s 
protests are motivated by state use of forced disappearances in particular, but that forced 
disappearances will not cause more protest in general, respectively.  As with the last 
chapter, I first present a test of my hypotheses on a global sample of states from 1990-
2012.  Secondarily, at the end of the chapter, I present a number of robustness tests, 
including an analysis of regional variation. 
As a reminder, the hypotheses tested in this chapter are as follows. 
H2 – Women will protest more when the government uses forced disappearance 
as a repressive tactic than if the government does not use forced disappearance.   
H3 – Women will protest more when the government uses forced disappearance, 
but there will not be more protests from other groups. 
Research Design 
The research design employed to test my second and third hypotheses is similar to 
the one described in the previous chapter.  I again utilize a time-series cross-sectional 
dataset of women’s protests and other country-level covariates.  These data cover the 
1990 to 2012 period, and are reported in Murdie and Peksen (2014).  The unit of analysis 
is country-year.  My primary dependent variable to test H2 is the same as the data used 
for H1, a count of women’s protests in a given year, and so the primary modelling 
strategy is again negative binomial regression8.   H3, however, requires a different 
dependent variable – a measure of general protests.  I use data on general nonviolent 
protests, also collected by Murdie and Peksen (2014), to test H3.  Specifically, in this 
                                                 
8 Additional tests did not reveal significant zero-inflation. 
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chapter I use negative binomial regression models to compare the predictors of women’s 
protests to the predictors of general protests.  Note that all significance tests reported are 
two-tailed, and that figures show 84 percent confidence intervals (meaning that overlap 
between confidence intervals should be interpreted as statistical insignificance).  Here, 
the main independent variable is a disaggregated measure of state use of forced 
disappearance, which comes from CIRI.  The disaggregated measures of repression 
(including disappearance) are not lagged, due to the fact that protests are a rapid response 
to current conditions, whereas all other time-varying covariates are lagged by one year to 
help ease concerns about endogeneity.  While this modelling decision does potentially 
create concerns about endogeneity between the dependent variable and my primary 
independent variables, I conduct further tests to examine this possibility and do not find 
cause for concern about a reciprocal relationship. 
Primary Dependent Variable 
The primary dependent variable, a count of women’s protests, is the same as 
described in the previous chapter.  For a more detailed discussion of this variable, see the 
section Dependent Variable, in Chapter 3.  This data comes from Murdie and Peksen 
(2014), who provide a global events data measure of women’s protests.  The data is a 
count, ranging from 0 to 205, and thus the modeling strategy is again negative binomial 
regression. 
Secondary Dependent Variable 
My theory suggests that women protest “as women” rather than as part of a more 
general protest strategically.  The empirical implication of my argument is that there will 
be more women’s protests when the government disappearances (H2), but general 
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protests are no more likely in those circumstances (H3).  In order to test this hypothesis, I 
wish to compare the predictors of women’s protests, specifically, to protests more 
generally.  To do this, I use the same IDEA database’s information on general nonviolent 
protests.  This dataset provides a count of all nonviolent protests, which were not lead by 
women or women’s groups, in a given year.  In other words, these are broader social 
protests organized and carried out by both men and women.    I use this data on 
nonviolent protests, rather than a sum of violent and nonviolent protests, due to data 
availability limitations.  Data on violent, general protests is not available from the same 
source.  While an imperfect comparison, because the women’s protest measure includes 
both violent and nonviolent protests, these measures should give me a reasonable proxy 
for overall levels of contention.  However, comparing the two should not be problematic, 
especially given that women are considerably less likely to support violent action in the 
first place (see, for instance; Caprioli 2000, de Boer 1985, Fite, Genest, and Wilcox 1990, 
Frankovic 1982, McGlen & Sarkees 1993, Mueller 1973, 1994, Shapiro & Mahajan 
1986, Smith 1984, Togeby 1994).  Using this variable, I can compare women’s protests 
to general, non-violent protests by mixed gender groups, which can demonstrate which 
circumstances lead to one type of protest vs. the other (or to both types). 
Independent Variable 
My theory predicts that women will protest when the state makes use of forced 
disappearance, and that disappearances should correlate with women’s protests but not 
general protests.  To measure this independent variable, I use the Cingranelli and 
Richards (CIRI, 2010) Physical Integrity Rights data, which provides a measure of 
whether a state made use of forced disappearances in a given year.  This measure takes a 
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value from zero to two, which I have rescaled so that a score of zero represents no 
evidence of government use of forced disappearances, a score of one indicates some 
limited use of that tactic, and a score of two represents widespread use disappearances.  I 
include the measures of the other repressive tactics (e.g. political imprisonment) as 
control variables. 
Figure 8 shows the average observed number of women’s protests at varying 
levels of forced disappearance.  In other words, it illustrates a “line of best fit” by 
performing a simple bivariate regression of protests onto disappearances.  This shows 
graphically that the expected relationship between women’s protests and disappearance is 
supported by the raw data.  Women’s protests do, in fact, appear to be more frequent 
when the state uses forced disappearance than when the state does not.  Of course, this is 
a “naïve” model without controls, but it is nonetheless suggestive that the expected 
relationship is plausible.   
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Figure 8:  Relationship between Women’s Protests and Disappearances 
 
Notes:  Figure plots the average observed number of women’s protests at varying 
observed levels of disappearance.  Controls are not included. 
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Controls 
In the analyses for H2 and H3, I include a number of controls thought to influence 
women’s protests.  These controls are largely the same as those described in the previous 
chapter.  For a detailed discussion of the measurement and expectations relevant to the 
other control variables which are the same as those in Chapter 3, see the section Controls 
in Chapter 3.   
There are two new control variables to discuss for these models.  First, my theory 
focuses on the state practice of forced disappearance.  However, there are other types of 
repression that states employ which I wish to control for.  To account for this, I include 
the other three disaggregated measures of repression from CIRI.  In particular, these 
include a measure of whether a state practices torture, extrajudicial killings, and/or 
political imprisonment.  These are measured the same way that disappearances are 
measure (i.e. 0 = no evidence of that repressive tactice, 1 = some use of the tactice, and 2 
= widespread use of that tactice).   
Second, when modeling H3, I want to account for the fact that women’s protest 
and general protests might be highly related phenomena.  Therefore, when modeling 
women’s protests and general protests, I include lagged measures of both women’s and 
general protests as control variables.  This should alleviate concerns that the two 
measures might be capturing the same process. 
Results 
 Table 7 shows results for my models testing H2:  that women protest more when 
the government uses forced disappearances.  Using the CIRI index for forced 
disappearance, I find support for H2:  the use of disappearances by the state is positively 
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and significantly associated with women’s protests.  Figure 8 shows this effect 
graphically based on predictions from Model 14.  As the level of forced disappearances 
increases, the predicted number of women’s protests goes from 1-2 to 4-8; at least double 
the number of expected protests by women.  The finding that disappearances are 
associated with higher levels of women’s protests is robust to many alternative modelling 
specifications, as you can see in the Appendix. 
 Other types of repression besides forced disappearances are also associated with 
increased numbers of women’s protests.  In particular, extrajudicial killings and political 
imprisonment are positively and significantly associated with more women’s protests, 
whereas torture is only significant in the full model.  I had no specific theoretical 
expectations about these repressive tactics, but it is interesting to see them relate to 
women’s protests as well.  However, I should note that the regional analysis which 
follows reveals that these relationships are inconsistent across regions. 
Economic factors are also important.  In particular, a growing GDP is associated 
with fewer protests, suggesting again that women are less likely to protest when the 
economy is improving.  Surprisingly, and counter to my expectations, election years are 
associated with fewer protests by women.  Perhaps this is due to the fact that major 
change is possible through voting, whereas protests are the only option for pressing 
reforms forward when there is not an election in the near future.  None of the other 
controls I include show a significant influence. 
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Table 7: Negative Binomial Regression of Women's Protests on Disappearance 
 Model 13 Model 14 
Dependent Variable Women’s Protests Women’s Protests 
Independent Variables   
Repression (CIRI)   
     Disappearance 0.34*** 0.32*** 
 (0.08) (0.09) 
     Extrajudicial Killing 0.25*** 0.23** 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
     Political Imprisonment 0.28** 0.32*** 
 (0.10) (0.10) 
     Torture 0.15 0.21* 
 (0.10) (0.09) 
Women’s Protests(t - 1) 0.04*** 0.03*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Women's Political Rights -0.07 0.02 
 (0.10) (0.11) 
Polity IV  -0.00 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Polity IV2 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) 
Election Year -0.20* -0.21* 
 (0.10) (0.10) 
Log GDP 0.11 -0.00 
 (0.64) (0.72) 
Log GDP2 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Log GDP per Capita -0.07 -0.04 
 (0.10) (0.10) 
GDP Growth -0.01** -0.02** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Media Bias 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.00) 
Women's INGOs  0.01+ 
  (0.00) 
% Labor Force Female  -0.01 
  (0.01) 
Gender Quota  -0.19 
  (0.17) 
Female Tertiary Education  -0.00 
  (0.01) 
Observations 2719 2235 
Pseudo R2 0.14 0.14 
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.  Clustered standard errors in parentheses, two-
tailed tests. 
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Figure 8:  Predicted Number of Women’s Protests at Levels of Disappearance 
 
Note:  Predictions based on Model 14.  
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Table 8 offers a test of my third hypothesis by comparing models of women’s 
protest to models of general protest.  In these models, I also include a control variable for 
the lagged level of the other type of protest, because these processes could be highly 
related.  Indeed, the pairwise correlation for women’s protest and general nonviolent 
protests is 0.513, which leads us to expect a positive relationship between the two. 
Again, disappearances are a positive and significant predictor of women’s 
protests, but do not show a relationship to general protests.  Figure 8 depicts the 
substantive effects of disappearances on the two protest types.  As disappearances 
increase, the expected number of women’s protests increases by a factor of about 1.7 
times, but the number of general protests is not significantly increased or decreased.  In 
these models, none of the other types of repression matter for predicting either type of 
protest. 
Interestingly, neither type of protest is predicted by the other type in the full 
model, in spite of their high correlation.  This adds further support to the idea that 
women’s protests are, in fact, very distinct from general protests, suggesting that the 
conditions that lead to high levels of women’s protest are different from those that 
increase general protests. 
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Table 8: Negative Binomial Regression of Protest Type on Disappearance 
 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 
Dependent Variable Women’s 
Protests 
Women’s 
Protests 
General 
Protests 
General 
Protests 
Independent Variables     
Disappearance 0.35*** 0.34*** 0.08 0.08 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) 
Extrajudicial Killing 0.21** 0.20** 0.00 0.00 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
Political Imprisonment 0.36*** 0.35*** 0.08 0.12+ 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) 
Torture 0.20* 0.23* 0.09 0.08 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) 
Women’s Protests(t - 1) 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.00+ 0.00* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
General Protests(t - 1) 0.00 0.00 0.01*** 0.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Women's Political Rights 0.06 0.05 0.14+ 0.03 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) 
Polity IV  -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Polity IV2 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Election Year -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Log GDP -0.19 -0.18 1.31* 1.53* 
 (0.66) (0.72) (0.64) (0.70) 
Log GDP2 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Log GDP per Capita -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.06 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) 
GDP Growth -0.01* -0.01* 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Media Bias -0.03+ -0.03 -0.08*** -0.07*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Women's INGOs  0.01+  0.01* 
  (0.00)  (0.00) 
% Labor Force Female  -0.01  0.01 
  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Gender Quota  -0.12  -0.27* 
  (0.19)  (0.12) 
Female Tertiary Education  -0.00  0.01 
  (0.01)  (0.00) 
Observations 1988 1946 1842 1804 
Pseudo R2 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.14 
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.  Clustered standard errors in parentheses, two-tailed tests.  
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Here, again, for both types of protest, economic factors are very important.  GDP 
exhibits a non-linear relationship with both women’s and general protests:  at high and 
low levels of wealth, protest is lower.  GDP per capita, my proxy for development, shows 
a depressing effect on women’s protests, and though negatively signed, GDP per capita is 
not significantly related to general protests.  Media bias also positively predicts both 
types of protest, which is in line with expectations. 
Interestingly, when controlling for the level of general protests, women’s labor 
force participation becomes negative and significant for women’s protests.  This may 
indicate that when women have better access to the labor market they no longer organize 
as women, but instead as part of broad-based protests.  Women’s political rights 
negatively predict general protests, perhaps for similar reasons:  when women’s rights are 
already respected, there is a lower demand for change. 
Women’s INGOs do not significantly predict either women’s or general protests.  
This is somewhat surprising given strong theoretical reasons to expect a positive 
relationship.  However, this null finding may simply be an artifact of two things.  First, 
by 1990, women’s INGOs may already have proliferated to the point of saturation, and so 
INGOs had reached their “ceiling” for affecting the level of protests.  In addition, the 
level of women’s INGOs does not exhibit much change within countries over time (see 
Appendix B), and thus can be thought of as close to constant.  Levels of democracy, 
elections, gender quotas, economic growth, and female tertiary enrollment do not exhibit 
statistically significant relationships to either women’s or general protests.  Again, these 
factors are likely important globally, but may lack explanatory power within the region 
and timeframe.  
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Figure 9:  Predicted Number of Women’s and General Protests by Level of 
Disappearance 
 
Notes:  Predictions derived from Models 16 and 18, respectively.  
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Robustness Tests 
 As in the previous chapter, I now present a few selected robustness tests.  In 
particular, Table 9 shows the models testing H2 applied to the regional subsets described 
in the previous chapter.  These models reveal that the relationship between forced 
disappearance and women’s protests is in the expected direction in all regions analyzed.  
However, this relationship fails to reach standard levels of statistical significance in the 
South Asian region.  Again, this might be due to meaningful regional differences, or 
could be caused by the relatively fewer observations within that regional classification.  
All in all, the findings are remarkably consistent across regions. 
 In Table 10, I show regional tests for H3.  Recall that H3 suggests a null 
relationship between disappearances and general protests.  As expected, none of the 
regional subsets demonstrate a statisticall significant relationship between disappearance 
and general protests.  Indeed, none of the other measures of repression appear to be 
associated with higher levels of general protests either.   
 
  
94 
 
Table 9: Negative Binomial Regression of Women's Protests on Disappearance (Regions) 
 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 Model 24 
Region LAC EAP ECA MENA SA SSA 
Dependent 
Variable 
Women’s 
Protests 
Women’s 
Protests 
Women’s 
Protests 
Women’s 
Protests 
Women’s 
Protests 
Women’s 
Protests 
Independent 
Variables 
      
Repression 
(CIRI) 
      
  Disappearance 0.49*** 0.35** 0.37** 0.35* 0.14+ 0.23* 
 (0.12) (0.13) (0.14) (0.16) (0.08) (0.11) 
  Extrajudicial  0.03 -0.07 0.37** 0.05 -0.24 0.34** 
    Killing (0.15) (0.16) (0.14) (0.12) (0.35) (0.12) 
  Political  0.04 -0.13 0.31* 0.30+ 0.58*** 0.23 
    Imprisonment (0.08) (0.10) (0.12) (0.18) (0.16) (0.16) 
  Torture 0.14 0.06 -0.17 0.09 0.78* 0.33+ 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.11) (0.18) (0.36) (0.17) 
Women’s  0.04*** 0.03** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.02* 0.03 
  Protests(t - 1) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
Women's  -0.44* -0.16 -0.42+ -0.28 0.55*** 0.07 
  Political Rights (0.21) (0.24) (0.23) (0.22) (0.12) (0.19) 
Polity IV  -0.05*** 0.04+ 0.04 0.06 -0.01 -0.11*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) 
Polity IV2 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00 0.02+ 0.01 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Election Year 0.03 -0.15 -0.00+ 0.14 1.07*** 0.00*** 
 (0.20) (0.19) (0.00) (0.32) (0.19) (0.00) 
Log GDP 2.80* 4.16*** -2.75* 2.51 12.06** -0.92 
 (1.35) (0.96) (1.12) (3.31) (3.72) (2.61) 
Log GDP2 -0.05+ -0.07*** 0.06** -0.05 -0.24** 0.03 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) 
Log GDP -0.54** -0.35* 0.21 -0.31* -0.08 -0.35+ 
  per Capita (0.17) (0.15) (0.25) (0.13) (0.35) (0.18) 
GDP Growth 0.01 0.02 -0.00 -0.04+ 0.08 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.06) (0.01) 
Media Bias 0.17* 0.03* 0.01 0.28** 0.01+ 0.27* 
 (0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.10) (0.01) (0.12) 
Observations 437 300 775 300 120 740 
Pseudo R2 0.16 0.18 0.14 0.15 0.20 0.16 
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.  Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 10: Negative Binomial Regression of General Protests on Disappearance (Regions) 
 Model 25 Model 26 Model 27 Model 28 Model 29 Model 30 
Region LAC EAP ECA MENA SA SSA 
Dependent 
Variable 
General 
Protests 
General 
Protests 
General 
Protests 
General 
Protests 
General 
Protests 
General 
Protests 
Independent 
Variables 
      
Repression 
(CIRI) 
      
  Disappearance 0.09 0.15 -0.06 0.10 0.07 0.00 
 (0.13) (0.17) (0.10) (0.09) (0.05) (0.14) 
  Extrajudicial  -0.04 0.16 -0.19 -0.18 -0.10 0.07 
    Killing (0.16) (0.12) (0.17) (0.12) (0.10) (0.12) 
  Political  0.07 0.19+ 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.08 
    Imprisonment (0.07) (0.12) (0.11) (0.20) (0.07) (0.10) 
  Torture 0.11 -0.09 0.14 -0.05 -0.09 0.23+ 
 (0.10) (0.17) (0.10) (0.13) (0.07) (0.14) 
Women’s  -0.01 0.01+ 0.01* -0.01+ 0.00+ 0.01+ 
  Protests(t - 1) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Women's  -0.43** 0.14 -0.31+ 0.05 0.14+ 0.27 
  Political Rights (0.14) (0.16) (0.18) (0.17) (0.08) (0.20) 
Polity IV  -0.01 0.05** 0.03 0.01 -0.05*** -0.08** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) 
Polity IV2 0.00 -0.01* -0.01** -0.01 0.00 0.01** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Election Year -0.02 0.06 -0.05 -0.19 0.31** 0.25 
 (0.11) (0.09) (0.10) (0.14) (0.10) (0.15) 
Log GDP 4.82*** 3.56** 2.00+ 3.08 8.71*** -0.57 
 (0.70) (1.20) (1.11) (3.97) (0.52) (2.49) 
Log GDP2 -0.09*** -0.06* -0.03 -0.06 -0.17*** 0.02 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.08) (0.01) (0.06) 
Log GDP -0.54** -0.07 0.16 -0.20 -0.11*** -0.12 
  per Capita (0.19) (0.10) (0.16) (0.16) (0.03) (0.16) 
GDP Growth -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Media Bias 0.28** 0.06* 0.03** 0.40** 0.04*** 0.15 
 (0.09) (0.03) (0.01) (0.14) (0.01) (0.16) 
Observations 300 204 527 198 82 500 
Pseudo R2 0.16 0.14 0.10 0.12 0.26 0.11 
+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.  Clustered standard errors in parentheses.  
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Chapter 5 – Empirics:  Women Participate in Protests in Repressive Contexts 
In this chapter, I provide empirical tests of H4 and H5.  H4 suggests that women 
will be generally less likely to participate in protests, compared to men.  H5, however, 
suggests that this relationship between gender and protest participation is conditional on 
state repression, specifically that women will be more likely to protest when the state 
uses forced disappearances, but men will not.  For this chapter, I use data from the Latin 
American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) to test my final two hypotheses on a sample 
of 18 Latin American countries in 2006 and 2008.  In addition, I provide additional 
robustness tests and alternative model specifications at the end of the chapter. 
As a reminder, the two hypotheses tested in this chapter are as follows: 
H4 – During times when the government is not repressive, women will be less 
likely to participate in protests compared to men. 
H5 – Women will be more likely to participate in protests when the government 
uses disappearances, whereas men will not be more likely to participate in 
protests under those conditions. 
Why Latin America? 
 As mentioned, in this chapter I use survey data from Latin America to test my 
arguments about the individual and state level factors that affect protest participation, 
particularly gender and repression.  I choose to study this relationship within the Latin 
American region for a number of reasons.  The first is that meaningful country level 
variation is present in the timeframe.  Secondarily, the substantive importance of both the 
dependent and independent variable in the Latin American region cannot be understated.  
Finally, for case selection purposes, limiting my analyses to the Latin American region 
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allows me to control for potential unobservable confounding variables, such as the 
historical legacy of American foreign policy during the Cold War, and the ongoing 
regional conflicts surrounding the “War on Drugs”. 
 When looking at the Latin American region, women protest “as women” 
frequently.  Even in the post-military regime period (1990 to 2012), there is a great deal 
of variation in women’s protest.  Figure 10 shows trends over time in both women’s 
protest and state’s disrespect for physical integrity rights, which graphically shows 
evidence that women’s protests seem to be associated with high levels of government 
repression.  With both measures, a higher score represents higher rates of protest and/or 
higher levels of repression.  In terms of women’s protest, Colombia and Peru stand apart, 
showing massive waves of women’s protest, whereas Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico have 
seen middling levels of women’s mobilization, and many other Latin American states 
saw little protest over time from women.  For the most part, those states with poor 
physical integrity rights also had high levels of women’s protests. 
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Figure 10:  Women’s Protests and State Repression in Latin America, 1990-2009 
 
 
Note:  Women’s protest is a count of all protests by women in a given country-year.  The 
measure of repression is the CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index.  This comes from 
Cingranelli and Richards (2010), and scores range from 0-8, transformed so that a higher 
score means greater state repression. 
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 In this chapter, I focus on the relationship of women’s protests and repression in 
the Latin American region.  There are compelling reasons to limit the scope to this 
region, and these reasons broadly fall into normative and research design motives.  
Turning first to normative reasons, further exploring both the dependent variable 
(women’s protests) and the independent variable (repression) are critical for our 
understanding of Latin America.  As you can see in Figure 10, women’s protests are 
fairly common in the region from 1990 to 2010.  Given that protests are costly, both for 
participants and for governments, understanding what causes women to protest is 
critically important. 
 Women’s protests are especially important in the Latin American context because 
historically women’s participation has played a critical role in the democratization 
process that began in the late 1970s (Baldez, 2003, 2002, Navarro, 1989, Schirmer, 
1989).  Even as the government was highly repressive of opposition, women in Argentina 
(Navarro, 1989), Guatemala, and Uruguay (Schirmer, 1989) took to the streets to demand 
information about their missing children.  These women’s protests took place because of 
– and in spite of – massively repressive government regimes that were “disappearing” 
thousands of citizens at the time.  The history of the region shows that women’s political 
involvement can play a crucial role in creating social change.   
 Indeed, not only are women’s protests important in Latin America, but repression 
has been a major issue for many countries there as well.  During the period of military 
rule, many countries in Latin America experienced a great deal of physical integrity 
rights violations.  Even in the post-democratization period, repression is common in Latin 
American countries.  For example, even from the period of 1990-2010, more countries 
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than not experienced at least one year in which there was some use of the practice of 
forced disappearances (see Figure 10).   
 In addition to the normative importance of understanding the relationship of 
women’s protests to repression in the region, isolating my analysis to Latin America is 
also advantageous from a research design perspective.  In order to test my argument, I 
need a large number of countries over a long period of time with variation on both the 
dependent variable and the independent variable.  Latin America provides both:  
women’s protests are fairly frequent but vary widely by country and over time, and 
repression occurs relatively often in many different countries but not in every year.   
 Secondarily, limiting the scope of this aspect of my study to Latin America allows 
me to control for many variables that might confound the relationships I seek to isolate.  
For example, many countries in the region have had similar historical experiences, from a 
shared colonial heritage as largely Spanish colonies, to a long period of military rule, to 
more recent shared experiences such as the “Left Turn”.  Given the similarities among 
countries in Latin America, differences in levels of women’s protests between countries 
are less likely to be a result of differences in things like culture or general acceptance of 
unrest. 
Research Design 
While the dependent variable at the country-level utilized by the preceding 
empirical chapters represents an excellent opportunity to analyze women’s protests at the 
aggregate level, and to compare women’s protests to more general protests, we may 
worry about relying on this measure alone for a few reasons.  First, my theory suggests 
that there are individual level factors at play.  H4 and H5 operate at the level of 
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individuals deciding whether to participate in protests or not.  If, at the country level, 
more protests by women were recorded when the state made use of forced disappearances 
but women, individually, were not more likely to protest under such circumstances, that 
might suggest that only motivated activists and those most directly affected by 
disappearances turned out in protest, but women generally were not more politically 
outspoken in those conditions. The second concern is the possibility of an “ecological 
fallacy” (c.f. Seligson 2002).  Particularly, in this case we are concerned with the 
“individualistic fallacy”, wherein we falsely infer patterns at the individual level from 
aggregated data.  Because my theory relies on both individual and country level 
dynamics, it should be further strengthened by investigating individual-level variation.   
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable, used to test H4 and H5, relies on self-reported 
information about individual protest participation from the Latin American Public 
Opinion Project (LAPOP) for the years 2006 and 2008.  While these data cover fewer 
years than the country level data, there is coverage of all the countries in the region.  
Importantly, they also exhibit variation on the primary country-level independent 
variable, the use of forced disappearance.  Ten countries in the region experienced at least 
some use of forced disappearances during at least one of those two years, and Colombia 
experienced a high number of disappearances in both years.   
This variable is coded as follows.  Respondents were asked: “[…] Thinking about 
the last 12 months, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march?”  The 
variable takes a value of 1 if the respondent had participated in a protest in the last 12 
months (at the time of the interview), and 0 if they had not.  This variable allows me to 
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compare both women’s and men’s reported protest activity.  Given that this variable is an 
individual level one, but my primary independent variable and several important controls 
are country level variables, the following analysis uses multi-level logistic regression, 
and again all tests are two-tailed. 
Primary Individual Level Independent Variable 
My theory predicts that not only will women’s groups and women activists protest 
when the state uses forced disappearances, but that individual women also perceive their 
relative advantages and women will thus be more apt to protest than men under these 
conditions.  In other words, my theory implies a cross-level interaction between gender 
and the state’s use of forced disappearance.  When the state uses disappearances, I expect 
that women will be more likely to protest than when the state does not use disappearance.  
Men, however, should not be more apt to protest under those conditions.  In order to test 
this conditional hypothesis, I interact both the country level disappearance variable from 
CIRI (2010) and the individual respondent’s gender. 
Country Level Independent Variable 
My theory predicts that women will be more likely to participate in protest when 
the state makes use of forced disappearance.  To measure this independent variable, I use 
the Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI; 2010) Physical Integrity Rights data, which provides 
a measure of whether a state made use of forced disappearances in a given year.  This 
measure takes a value from zero to two, which I have rescaled so that a score of zero 
represents no evidence of government use of forced disappearances, a score of one 
indicates some limited use of that tactic, and a score of two represents widespread use 
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disappearances.  This variable is interacted with a respondent’s gender to observe 
whether the effects of disappearance at the country level are conditional on gender. 
Controls 
 Since this analysis includes individual level data, I am able to control for 
additional individual level factors that might influence protest participation.  I include a 
control for respondent’s age, as well as a squared term for age.  I control for the 
respondent’s marital status.  I control for the level of education that a respondent has 
attained (primary, secondary, college, and post-graduate).  I also control for whether the 
respondent lived in a rural or urban area.  People living in cities likely have easier access 
to public spaces where protests typically occur, and consequently a larger potential 
audience.   
 Socioeconomic status has long been theorized to influence political participation 
broadly (e.g. Verba, Brady, and Schlozman, 1995) and economic factors are known to 
influence protest activity (e.g. Brancati 2013).   For personal socioeconomic status, I use 
the quintiles of wealth measure developed by Córdova (2009).  This measure relies on 
physical household assets (e.g. the number of vehicles), and is preferable to an outright 
measure of income, because of a large non-response bias on standard income questions, 
particularly with LAPOP data (Córdova 2009).  This provides a reasonable metric of how 
poor/wealthy a respondent is, in relation to their social context.  In addition, I control for 
the respondent’s current employment status. 
 Additional controls for respondent ideology and subjective measures of economic 
and personal satisfaction are also included.  I include controls for whether respondent 
feels their personal economic situation has declined in the last year, whether they 
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believed the country’s economic situation has worsened in the past year, and their current 
level of satisfaction with life in general.  These first two would motivate more protests, 
whereas a generally satisfied respondent is probably less likely to protest. 
Results 
 Individual-level analyses reveal similar dynamics to the country level.  As 
predicted by H4, women are generally less likely to protest when the state is not 
repressive.  The use of disappearances, however, changes the effect of respondent gender.  
Under conditions of repression, women become more likely to protest than before.  In 
fact, as seen in Figure 12, the gender gap in protest participation at the individual level 
disappears, and nearly reverses and becomes positive, when the state is using forced 
disappearances.  In other words, women are at least as likely (and very nearly more 
likely) than men to protest when the state uses disappearance.  Individual women do 
seem to recognize that they have a higher ability to protest in this repressive context. 
 As for individual control variables, age appears to matter in some models but not 
others.  Generally, this variable suggests that the very young and very old are less likely 
to protest than those in the middle age group are.  Married people do not show any 
significant difference in protest participation relative to single people.  Those with more 
education do tend to protest more often than those with lower education levels.  Right 
wing respondents were less likely than those on the left to protest.  Subjective feelings 
about the country and one’s personal economic situation do not appear to relate to protest 
participation, but overall satisfaction with life does lower the likelihood of protesting. 
 At the country level, media bias towards a country is associated with a higher 
level of protests among respondents.  The level of democracy, captured by Polity, does 
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not have significant effects, but this is not surprising given that only two years are 
captured and so there is not much variation.  For this cross-section, overall GDP is 
associated with higher protests at the very high and low ends of the spectrum, with fewer 
protests in the middle range.  Finally, GDP per capita has a depressing effect:  
respondents in more developed countries tend to show lower levels of protest.   
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Table 11:  Mixed Effects Logistic Regression of Protest Participation on Covariates 
Independent Variables Model 31 Model 32 Model 33 Model 34 
Cross-Level Interaction     
Female -0.243*** -0.218*** -0.191*** -0.203*** 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.044) (0.044) 
Disappearance -0.661*** -0.407*** 0.288** 0.209 
 (0.146) (0.140) (0.143) (0.151) 
Female X Disappearance 0.181** 0.165** 0.197** 0.181** 
 (0.078) (0.077) (0.079) (0.078) 
Individual Level Variables     
Age 0.017** 0.013* 0.003 0.004 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Age2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Married 0.033 0.035 0.037 0.053 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.044) (0.044) 
Education Level 0.166*** 0.159*** 0.143*** 0.131*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Wealth (Quintiles) 0.016 0.019 0.026* 0.028* 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
Employed -0.151*** -0.081* 0.079* 0.052 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.047) (0.047) 
Rural -0.009 -0.012 0.017 0.001 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) 
Right Wing -0.040*** -0.038*** -0.026*** -0.030*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Personal Economy -0.004 0.000 0.002 -0.017 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) 
Country Economy 0.021 0.021 0.016 0.017 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) 
Life Satisfaction -0.093*** -0.092*** -0.091*** -0.078*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) 
Country Level Variables     
Media Bias 5.975*** 5.262*** 3.639*** 2.433*** 
 (0.557) (0.531) (0.547) (0.550) 
Repression -0.467***    
 (0.083)    
Polity IV  7.216   
  (5.297)   
Polity IV2  -0.548*   
  (0.313)   
Log GDP   -127.398***  
   (8.578)  
Log GDP2   2.479***  
   (0.174)  
Log GDP per Capita    -7.195*** 
    (0.617) 
Constant -3.243*** -25.894 1,624.988*** 56.129*** 
 (1.118) (21.746) (105.517) (5.267) 
Observations 19,299 19,299 18,102 18,102 
Number of groups 18 18 17 17 
     
Chi2 445 522 787 562 
P > Chi2 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, standard errors in parentheses, two-tailed tests.   
107 
 
Figure 11:  Effect of Respondent Gender on Likelihood of Protest Participation at Levels 
of Disappearance 
 
Note:  Predictions in this figure derived from Model 34.  
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Chapter 6 – Conclusion 
This dissertation is an exploration of women’s protests that seeks to both shed 
light on the unique role of gender in shaping protest behavior while also recognizing the 
similarities between women’s protests and other forms of contentious mobilization.  In 
this concluding chapter, I summarize the major and minor contributions of this project as 
I see them, I provide some of my ideas for building upon this foundation in future work, 
and I reiterate the importance of continuing to study women’s protests. 
Contributions of this Dissertation 
 This dissertation presents a big picture view of women’s protests.  Using the 
general theoreatical framework I develop in Chapter 2, I derive expectations about 
contexts in which women’s protests are similar to other protests, as well as uncovering 
contexts in which women’s protests are unique.  Women protest repression just as other 
groups do.  However, when repression is gendered, and society is especially patriarchal, 
women are paradoxically empowered by their previously detrimental gender roles.  The 
ability to politicize womanhood and motherhood serves as a crucial shield that protects 
women and encourages them to protest “as women” rather than as part of broader 
protests.   
 This dissertation demonstrates the critical importance of state repressive practices 
for understanding women’s protests, specifically.  This is both a contribution to our 
understanding of women’s protests, but also a contribution to the study of the effects of 
repression.  Previous works in this area have generally undervalued the role of gender in 
dissent, but this project demonstrates that both theorizing about gender and women’s 
participation are critical for understanding dissent in repressive contexts.   
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 To my knowledge, this is the first project to examine women’s protests at two 
levels – utilizing both globally comprehensive data on women’s protests at the country-
year level as well as regionally exhaustive individual level data on women’s participation 
in protests.  This is an important departure from previous works because it allows us to 
examine whether patterns observed at the country level really hold at the individual level 
(c.f. Seligson 2002).  For example, when I observed in Chapters 3 and 4 that women’s 
protests become more numerous in repressive states, it might have been the case that only 
some women were more likely to protest in those contexts.  However, in Chapter 5, I find 
that this pattern actually holds for women in general, and that all women become more 
likely to protest under repressive contexts, compared to men. 
 Indeed, to my knowledge, this is the first large scale research endeavor that 
explicitly models the links between state level human rights practices to individual level 
behaviors and attitudes.  This is a major contribution to the study of human rights, 
because many of the extant theories on human rights rely on assumptions about how 
citizens perceive and respond to state actions, but do not explicitly test those 
assumptions.   
 For example, many previous works on repression assume that citizens generally 
respond negatively to repression.  However, preliminary analysis made possible by my 
data collection and multilevel modelling efforts has demonstrated that this assumption is 
questionable, at least within the Latin American context.  Consider the following 
graphical representation.  Using a similar model to the ones developed in Chapter 5, I 
model citizens’ predicted level of trust in government at varying levels of state 
repressiveness, interacted with citizens’ self-reported level of right-wing ideology.  As 
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you can see, when the state is not very repressive, there is no difference in level of trust in 
government between left- and right-wing citizens.  However, at middling and high levels 
of repression by the state, more right-wing citizens actually report much higher levels of 
trust in government, compareted to left-wing citizens.  This analysis is obviously very 
preliminary and needs a great deal of elaboration, but this is the kind of question that my 
approach will allow us to answer more fully in the future. 
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Figure 12:  Trust In Government over Ideology and Repression 
 
Note:  Predictions derived from mixed effects logit model, including all controls, as seen 
in previous chapter.  
3.
8
4
4.
2
4.
4
4.
6
4.
8
Li
ne
ar
 P
re
di
ct
io
n,
 F
ix
ed
 P
or
tio
n
1 10
Right Wing Ideology Scale
State Unrepressive State Middling Repressive
State Very Repressive
Predicted Level of Trust in Government
112 
 
Avenues for Future Researh 
 One clear avenue for further work is to examine is to examine the decision 
process of the state in choosing to repress and practicing repression.  This project 
demonstrates that gender and attitudes about women play a role in both of these 
processes.  However, it is still unclear what the full role of gender is in determining state 
repressive behavior.  Future works should take up the task of theorizing state repressive 
behavior through the lense of gender. 
 As I mentioned in the previous section, future avenues for research linking 
individual citizen attitudes and behaviors to state level repressive practices are fruitful 
grounds for much future work.  I have demonstrated one such area, but there are likely 
hundreds more questions we could ask using this approach.  How do citizens feel about 
repression?  Are the effects gendered in other ways, outside of protest behavior?  What 
citizens support the regime in spite of human rights violations, and why?  These are all 
incredibly interesting topics for future research to tackle.   
Why Still Study Women’s Protests? 
Normatively speaking, women’s protests are incredibly important.  This has never 
been more obvious than in the aftermath of the election of Donald Trump as president of 
the United States.  Not even 24 hours after he was sworn in, a massive wave of protests, 
primarily organized by and for women, exploded both in Washington D.C. and cities both 
across the US and around the world.  Women on all seven continents (including 
Antarctica) marched in solidarity against the new administration.  While clearly a very 
different situation from women protesting in a highly repressive context, the logic of my 
argument can still shed light on this wave of protests.  In this case, the loss of an election 
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and the transition to a more hostile new administration, rather than outright repression, is 
the motivating grievance that drove over 4 million women to the streets in protest. 
In what ways did the political climate favor women, specifically, to organize?  
While I think we need to think more on this, it was probably because of the framing of 
the campaigns.  This campaign was different in that it was the first time a woman was 
running on a major party ticket for the general election.  Secondarily, much of the 
campaign season was spent litigating gender issues on both sides (for Hillary, Bill’s past 
infidelities and her reaction to those things, and for Trump, litigating his alleged 
misogyny and many accusations of past sexual misconduct towards women).  This 
gender focus on the campaign trail probably helped to bring gender issues to the 
foreground after the election in way that favored women organizing specifically around 
their gender. 
In addition, another important implication of my work is that repression is 
gendered, and that both governments practicing repression do so in a way that reflects 
and reinforces gender structures, and that men and women experience government 
repression differently as a consequence of this.  Governments typically hesitate to 
disappear women because they view women as non-threatening and politically powerless.  
However, this perception is false, and 
My research could be very useful in studying “like cases”.  In particular, the 
current political situation in the Philippines comes to mind.  Based on my argument, I 
would suspect that women and women’s groups are likely to be the most active in 
fighting against Duterte over the disappearances and other massive human rights 
violations that are ongoing due to his “drug war”.  Human rights groups, other nations, 
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and international actors of all kinds should anticipate that it may be women, in particular, 
who are the key to changing that state’s behavior.  They should also do as much as they 
can to mitigate the danger to women’s groups and women activists on the ground and 
provide them with support and resources for mobilizing. 
All this is to say that women’s mobilization is frequent, it is critically important 
for calling out human rights violations and for democratization efforts, and it is not going 
away any time soon.  Understanding women’s protests is a supremely important endeavor 
for scholars of gender, of protests, of human rights practices, of democracy, to 
collectively undertake.  This project is meant to advance our knowledge of women’s 
protests in some small way, but also to provide a stepping stone for future work on the 
subject to build, debate, and improve upon. 
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Appendices 
Here you can find the appendices for this dissertation.  Appendix A includes both 
descriptive statistics and visualizations of data used in the empirical chapters, as well as 
supplementary information about question wordings.  Appendix B includes additional 
robustness tests for my models of H1-H5 which are not reported within their respective 
empirical chapters.  Finally, Appendix C includes a partial list of names of the victims of 
forced disappearance in Argentina and Brazil during the military regimes in those 
respective countries.  These can be used to replicate the gender information found in 
Chapter 2. 
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Appendix A:  Descriptive Statistics 
Table A1:  Regional Composition 
Region Name Countries Included 
Latin America 
and the 
Caribbean 
(LAC) 
Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Puerto Rico, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela. 
East Asia and 
Pacific 
Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, China, Fiji, Indonesia, Japan, South 
Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, 
Myanmar, New Zealand, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, 
Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and 
Vanuatu. 
Europe and 
Central Asia 
(ECA) 
Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, 
Bosznia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Macedonia, Moldova, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Russia, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine, United Kingdom, and Uzbekistan. 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, 
Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. 
South Asia 
(SA) 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, 
and Sri Lanka. 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA)  
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, the Republic of Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Equatorial 
Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao 
Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, 
South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe. 
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Figure A1:  Average Global Level of Democracy over Time 
 
Note:  Data comes from Polity IV.  Scores range from -10 (least democratic) to +10 
(most democratic).  
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Figure A2:  Global Number of Women’s INGOs over Time
 
Note:  Data on number of women’s INGOs comes from Cole (2013). 
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Figure A3:  Average Global Respect for Women’s Rights over Time 
 
Note:  Data comes from CIRI (2010).  Scores range from 0 (None of women’s political 
rights are guaranteed by law. There are laws that completely restrict the participation of 
women in the political process.”) up to 4 (“Political equality is guaranteed by law and in 
practice. Women hold more than thirty percent of seats in the national legislature and/or 
in other high-ranking government positions”).    
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Appendix B:  Additional Robustness Tests 
 
Table B1:  Logistic Regression of Increased Repression on Covariates 
 Model 35 Model 36 Model 37 
Independent Variables    
    
Women’s Protests(t) -0.004  0.009 
 (0.003)  (0.006) 
Women’s Protests(t-1)  -0.009*** -0.016** 
  (0.003) (0.006) 
Polity IV -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.020*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Polity2 -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Presidential Election 0.116 0.103 0.107 
 (0.112) (0.110) (0.110) 
Log GDP -1.353*** -1.467*** -1.415*** 
 (0.406) (0.424) (0.420) 
Log GDP2 0.027*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Log GDP per Capita 0.009 0.004 0.009 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
GDP Growth -0.014 -0.011 -0.010 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
    
Constant 16.621*** 17.814*** 17.229*** 
 (4.942) (5.142) (5.099) 
    
Observations 3,302 3,168 3,168 
Psuedo-R2 0.024 0.023 0.023 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;  clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Note:  In these models, I check for endogeneity.  Here, the dependent variable is 
increased repression, which takes a value of 1 if the current level of repression is higher 
than the previous level in a given country, and 0 otherwise.  Neither the current year’s 
number of women’s protests nor the previous years number of women’s protests predict 
an increase in repression, suggesting that endogeneity is not a huge concern for H1.   
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Table B2:  Civil Conflict  
 Model 38 Model 39 Model 40 
Independent Variables    
    
Disappearance 0.333** 0.340** 0.275** 
 (0.136) (0.134) (0.122) 
Civil Conflict   1.230*** 
   (0.302) 
Polity IV -0.003 -0.025 -0.021 
 (0.022) (0.025) (0.021) 
Polity2 0.007 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) 
Presidential Election   -0.166 
   (0.147) 
Log GDP 1.249 0.474 0.803 
 (0.900) (1.029) (0.911) 
Log GDP2 -0.020 0.002 -0.005 
 (0.019) (0.022) (0.019) 
Log GDP per Capita 0.063 -0.320*** -0.253** 
 (0.119) (0.114) (0.100) 
GDP Growth 0.010 0.027 0.026 
 (0.010) (0.027) (0.026) 
 -0.027 -0.247  
Constant (0.141) (0.171)  
 -17.075 -9.596 -13.574 
 (10.960) (12.318) (10.871) 
    
Observations 431 2,311 2,756 
Psuedo-R2 0.057 0.11 0.11 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
One concern for H2 is that disappearances largely occur in the context of civil conflict, 
and so we might be capturing the effect of civil conflict with the disappearance measure.  
I use the PRIO measure of civil conflict here (0 if no conflict, 1 if more than 25 battle 
deaths occur).  These two events are highly correlated, so including both in a model 
introduces collinearity.  However, when I isolate the sample to only ongoing civil 
conflicts (Model 38), only non-civil conflicts (Model 39), or simply include both in one 
modle (Model 40), I find that disappearances still have the expected positive relationship 
with women’s protests.   
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Appendix C:  Names of the Disappeared 
 
Names of victims of forced 
disappearance, for data verification.  
Presented here in their memory. 
 
Argentina 
Juan Carlos Abachian  
Ana Catalina Abad de Perucca  
Dominga Abadía Crespo  
Felicidad Abadía Crespo  
José Abdala  
María Leonor Abinet  
Angel Luis Abraham  
Hernan Abriata  
José Ismael Acevedo  
Dora Acosta  
María Eliana Acosta Velasco de Badell  
Elba Eva Acuña de Sáez  
Marta Graciela Acuña  
Sirena Acuña  
Oscar Adamoli  
Rolando Elías Adem  
Claudio César Adur  
Padre Jorge Oscar Adur  
Nelson Roberto Agorio  
Hugo Agosti  
Américo Gines Agüero  
Tomás Rodolfo Agüero Ríos  
Ana Teresa del Valle Aguilar  
José Aguilar Bracesco  
Claudio Reyes Ahumada  
Alejandro Fabian Aibar  
Angela María Aieta de Gullo  
Liliana Ester Aimeta  
Cherif Omar Ainie Rojas  
Carlos César Aiub  
María Concepción Aiub  
Ricardo Emir Aiub  
Leticia Akselman  
Genaro Alarcón  
Carlos Esteban Alaye  
Pablo Eduardo Albarracín  
Roberto Omar Albornozr  
José Antonio Alcaraz Gonzalez  
Domingo Alconada Moreira  
Jorge Eduardo Alday Lazcoz  
Segundo Sixto Alderete  
Fernando Antonio Alduvino Bolzan  
José David Aleksoski  
Alberto Cayetano Alfaro  
Alicia Elena Alfonsín  
Carlos Alberto Almada Villalba  
Elvio Alberto Almada  
Ricardo Avelino Almaraz  
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Guillermo Abel Almarza  
Alejandro Almeida  
Mónica Almirón de Lauroni  
María Gloria Alonso Cifuentes de 
Sánchez  
Mirta Alonso de Hueravilo  
Raúl Alonso  
Julio Antonio Altamirano  
Lucio Bernardo Altamirano  
Dominga Alvarez de Scurta  
Federico Eduardo Alvarez Rojas  
Gerardo Julio Alvarez  
Horacio José Alvarez  
Jorge Alberto Álvarez  
José Carlos Alvarez González  
Julio Rolando Alvarez García  
Lucina Alvarez de Barros  
Marcelino Alvarez  
Osvaldo Angel Alvarez Alvarez  
María Cristina Alvira  
Raquel Alvira  
María Elena Amadio  
Fernando Adolfo Amarilla  
Guillermo Amarilla  
Nelly Ana Amato de Risso  
Norberto Félix Amarturi  
Salvador Leonardo Amico  
Lidia Inés Amigo  
Aníbal Alberto Anchepe  
Carlos Alberto Andisco  
José Eduardo Andrade  
Jorge Luis Andreani  
Juan Carlos Andreotti  
Luis Alberto Angelini  
Blanca Estela Angerosa  
Daniel Martín Angerosa  
Humberto Orlando Annone  
Héctor Alberto Antelo  
Daniel Antokoletz  
Néstor Rubén Antoñanzas  
Arturo Apaza  
José Luis Appel De La Cruz  
Francisca Aragón  
Lidoro Oscar Aragón  
Raul Araldi  
Juan de Dios Aramayo Vallejos  
Isauro Arancibia  
Napoleón Argentino Araneda  
Juan Cesáreo Arano  
Héctor Antonio Araujo  
Wenceslao Araujo  
Miguel Sergio Arcuschin  
Hugo Ardiles  
Nélida Beatriz Ardito  
Roberto Ardito  
Luis Ramon Aredez  
Alberto Francisco Arenas  
124 
 
Salvador Manuel Arestín  
Joaquín Enrique Areta  
Jorge Ignacio Areta  
Alberto Arévalo  
Alfredo Arévalo  
Antonio Arévalo  
Domingo Arévalo  
Emilio Confesor Arévalo  
Roberto Arfa  
Jorge Raúl Arfuch  
María de las Mercedes Argañaraz de 
Fresneda  
Carlos Enrique Arias  
Florentino Arias  
Segundo Bonifa Arias  
Julio César Arin Delacourt  
Joaquín Ariño  
Carlos María Aristegui  
Miguel Ángel Arkatyn  
Juana María Armelín  
Raúl Aroldi  
Miguel Angel Arra  
Jorge Omar Arreche  
Analía Alicia Arriola  
Juan Carlos Arroyo  
Horacio Antonio Arrué  
Rómulo Artieda  
María Asunción Artigas Nilo de Moyano  
Juan José María Ascone  
Pablo G Athanasiu Laschan  
Alfredo Apeleister  
Nicodemus Apeleister  
Jorge Omar Astudillo Galizia  
María Inés del Cármen Atim  
Abdala Auad  
Roberto Eduardo Aued  
Floreal Edgardo Avellaneda  
Lucrecia Mercedes Avellaneda Quintale  
Jorgelina Aquilina Avalos de Gómez  
Sara Fluvia Ayala de Morel  
Vicente Ayala  
Camila Elisabet Azar  
Emilio Azurmendi  
Esteban Benito Badell  
Julio Aníbal Badell  
Jorge Luis Badillo  
Miguel Ángel Badoff  
Adriana Bai  
Arturo Baibiene  
César Augusto Baldini  
Angel Baldraco  
Luis Alberto Baleano  
Pablo Alberto Balut  
Guillermo Luis Ball Llatinas  
Adrián Ceferino Ballestero "Victor"  
Esther Ballestrino de Careaga  
Daniel Agustín Baquero  
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Luis Antonio Barassi  
Hector Baratti  
Liliana Ester Barbieri  
Julio Elías Barcat  
Julio César Barozzi  
Eduardo Barrera  
Juan Carlos Barrera  
Raul Barreto Capelli  
Eduardo Froilan Barrios  
Washington Javier Barrios Fernandez  
María del Carmen Barros de Zaffora  
Oscar Osvaldo Barros  
Egidio Battistiol  
Raúl Augusto Bauducco  
Rubén Santiago Bauer Chimeno  
Alberto Noé Bayarsky  
Carlos Eduardo Becker  
Susana Beatriz Becker  
Darío Oscar Bedne  
María Bedoian de Ikonikoff  
Guillermo José Begega  
Juan Francisco Belaustegui  
Martín Belaustegui Herrera  
Rafael José Belaustegui Herrera  
Valeria Belaustegui Herrera de Waisberg  
Fernando Alberto Belizán  
Hugo Francisco Bellagamba  
Mariana Belli  
Andrés Humberto Bellizzi Bellizzi  
Juan Pedro Belluz  
Daniel Albino Benavídez  
Daniel Eduardo Bendersky  
Aníbal Carlos Benítez  
Ramona Benítez de Amarilla  
Vicente José Benítez  
Rutilio Dardo Betancour Roth  
Amado Berardo  
Remo Carlos Berardo  
Rubén Abel Beratz  
Martín Elías Bercovich  
Carlos José Guillermo Berdini  
Graciela Alicia Beretta  
María Magdalena Beretta Pose  
Azucena Ricarda Bermejo de Rondoletto  
Alberto Bernal Tejada  
José Pablo Bernard  
María Cristina Bernat  
Juan José Berninsone  
Horacio Félix Bertholet  
Carlos Guillermo Berti Dominguez  
Juan Ricardo Bertos  
Cristina Bettanin de Colmenares  
Leonardo Bettanin  
Ramón Oscar Bianchi  
Eduardo José Bicocca  
Salvador Juan Bidegorry  
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Patricio Biedma Scadewaldt  
Ricardo Miguel Biegkler Almendra  
María Cristina Bienposto  
Claudio Daniel Bignasco  
Guillermo Daniel Binstock  
Carlos Hugo Blanco  
Viviana Avelina Blanco  
Luis Rodolfo Bledel  
Hugo Alberto Boca  
Nestor Boca  
Nilda Mabel Boca de Mansilla  
Listo Ramón Bogado  
Francisco Javier Bogarini  
Victor Pablo Boichenko  
Adriana Silvia Boitano  
Guillermo Carlos Boitano Brañas  
Miguel Angel Boitano  
Liliana Beatriz Bojanich  
Daniel Bombara  
Raúl Alfredo Bonafini  
Ana Maria Bonatto  
Jorge Alberto Bonil  
Eduardo Bonin  
Nelly Yolanda Borda  
Raúl Edgardo Borelli Cattaneo  
Rodolfo Mario Borroni  
Carlos Borucio  
Oscar Isidro Borzi  
Juan Raúl Bourg Pineau  
Eduardo Julio Bracaccini  
Robert Marcel Boudet  
Susana Mercedes Boulocq Korn de 
Concetti  
Angel Enrique Brandazza  
Gabriel Braunstein  
Claudio Braverman  
Jesús María Bravo  
Omar Fernando Bravo  
Alfredo Oscar Brawerman  
Juan José Brero Tolosa  
Hortensia Brito  
Victor Mario Brizzi  
Julia Angélica Brocca de Herrero  
Fernando Ruben Brodsky  
Jose Daniel Bronzel  
Roberto Oscar Brullo Cea  
Carlos Alberto Bruni  
Aida Leonora Bruschtein Bonaparte  
Irene Bruschtein Bonaparte  
Victor Bruschtein Bonaparte  
Arnaldo Haroldo Buffa  
María Luisa Buffo  
Roberto Horacio Bugatti Osvald  
Eduardo Oscar Bulacio  
Tomás Angel Bulacio  
Alicia Raquel Burdisso  
Jorge Alberto Burghard  
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Julio Genaro Burgos Ponce  
Ada Margaret Burgueño  
Osvaldo Enrique Busetto  
Enrique Bustamante  
Juan Carlos Bustamante  
Aldo Meliton Bustos  
Cármen Santiago Bustos  
Edelmiro Cruz Bustos  
María Cristina Bustos de Coronel  
Miguel Ángel Bustos  
Miguel Angel Butrón  
José Caamaño Uzal  
Eduardo Luis Caballero  
Wenceslao Eduardo Caballero  
Damián Cabandié  
Nelson Martín Cabello Pérez  
Gustavo Alejandro Cabezas  
Dardo Cabo  
Oscar Ramón Cabral  
Ary Cabrera Prates  
Hugo Cacciavillani Caligari  
Jorge Eliseo Cáceres  
Edgar Claudio Cadima Torrez  
Eduardo Alberto Cagnola  
Ricardo Luis Cagnoni  
Claudio Caielli  
Rafael Caielli  
Liliana Beatriz Caimi de Marizcurrena  
Alfredo José Cajide  
Italo Américo Cali  
Jorge Donato Calvo  
Daniel Eduardo Calleja  
Norma Estela Campano  
Simón Campano  
Horacio Domingo Campiglia  
Horacio Raúl Campione  
Julio César Campopiano  
Antonia Adriana Campos de Alcaraz  
María Silvia Campos  
Jorge Candeloro  
José María Cane  
Arturo Canedo del Oso  
Luis Canfaila  
Ernesto Enrique Canga  
José Antonio Cano  
Alberto Canovas Estape  
Edison Oscar Cantero Freire  
Ana Beatriz Cantos de Caldera  
Luis Antonio Cantos  
Jorge Antonio Capello  
Carlos Hugo Capitman  
Julio Cesar Carboni  
Alvaro Cardenas  
Daniel Hugo Carignano  
Eduardo Carlas Salas  
Oscar Marcos Carloni  
128 
 
Adrián Orlando Carlovich  
Laura Estela Carlotto  
Carlos Alberto Carpani  
Pablo Carpintero Lobo  
Ricardo Carpintero Lobo  
Adriana María Carranza  
Carlos Alberto Carranza  
Cecilia María Carranza  
Gonzalo Abel Carranza  
Cristina Carreño Araya  
Roberto Eugenio Carri  
Manuel Daniel Carricondo  
Maria Inés Carrieri de Velásquez  
Norma Lidia Carrizo  
Carlos Roberto Carrozzino  
Ana María Caruso de Carri  
Gaspar Onofre Casado  
María Segunda Casado  
María Adriana Casajus de Gonzales 
Villar  
Edith María Casares  
Juan Carlos Casariego de Bel  
Honorio Orlando Casas  
Marta Beatriz Cascella  
Yolanda Iris Casco Ghelpi de D'Elia  
Claudio Argentino Casoy  
Héctor Daniel Cassataro  
Anibal Ramón Castagno Luzardo  
Roberto Castelli  
Haydée María Castelltort  
Miguel Ángel Castiglioni Cornes  
Ana María Castillo  
Liliana Graciela Castillo Barrios de 
Ovejero  
Norberto José Castillo  
Oscar Silverio Castillo  
Ramón Roque Castillo  
José María Castiñeiras  
Alfredo Jorge Castro Montero  
Héctor Castro  
Hugo Alberto Castro  
Luis Marcelo Castro Montero  
María Antonia Castro Huerga de 
Martínez  
Jorge Antonio Catanese  
Gladys Hebe Caudet  
Hector Cavallo  
Elisa E. Cayul de Cugura  
Jorge Omar Cazenave  
Jorge Omar Cazorla  
Santiago Alberto Cazón  
Laura Cedola de Monteagudo  
Edigo Jesús Cejas Arias  
Jorge Nestor Cena  
María Cenador de Rondoletto  
Norberto Centeno  
Francisco Tenório Cerqueira Júnior  
Alicia Dora Cerrota de Ramos  
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Liliana Teresa Certo  
Miguel Cervantes  
Luis Justo Augusto Cervera Novo  
Eduardo Cespedes  
Roberto Eduardo Cevasco  
Luis Alberto Ciancio  
David Nolver Cilleruelo  
Carlos Cinqualbre  
Luis German Cirigliano  
Ignacio Manuel Cisneros  
Ricardo Alberto Cittadini  
Roxana Teresa Claros Romero  
Jean Ives Claudet Fernandez  
Ines Adriana Cobo  
Luis Alberto Coconier  
Manuel Enrique Cohn  
Oscar Hugo Coker  
Juana Matilde Colayago de Battistiol  
Eduardo Alberto Colella  
Jaime José Colmenares  
Liliana Teresa Colombetti De Bulac  
Gerardo Coltzau Fernández  
Susana Aurora Collinet  
Atlántida Coma Velasco de Ardito  
Luis Commatteo  
Gastón Roberto Concalvez  
Abel Rodolfo Concetti  
Hugo Milciades Concha López  
Diana Noemí Conde  
Haroldo Pedro Conti  
Roberto Julio Coria  
Juan Bautista Coronel  
Ana Cristina Corral Romano  
Carlos Esteban Correa Bravo  
María Mercedes Correa  
Mariel Corsi  
Miguel Arcángel Cortez  
Carlos Gustavo Cortiñas  
Gabriel Fernando Costilla  
Margarita Del Carmen Costilla de 
Villagra  
María Cristina Cournour  
Mirtha Noelia Coutoune  
Carlos Alberto Coy  
Ricardo Alfredo Cravello  
Laura Noemí Creatore  
Laura Lía Crespo de Moya  
Rodolfo Alberto Crespo  
Roberto Luis Cristina  
Celso Pedro Cruces  
Alicia Edith Cruz de Rebagliati  
Mercedes Leonor Cuadrelli de Arin 
Delacourt  
María Georgina Cubas de Pérez  
Enrique Cuella  
Aberlardo H. Cuesta  
Hugo Ramón Cuesta  
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Jorge Anselmo Cueto  
José Esteban Cugura  
Juan Oscar Cugura  
Lucia Cullen  
Gloria Constanza Curia  
María Liliana Curra  
Domingo Hidelgardo Chacón  
José Rafael Chamas  
Francisco José Changazzo  
José Adhemar Changazzo  
Oscar Rodolfo Changazzo Riquiflor  
Juan Carlos Chaparro  
Ana María Chapeta Lario  
Gustavo Adolfo Chavarino  
Hector Gerardo Chaves  
José Guetas Chebala  
Juan Carlos Chersanaz  
Jacobo Chester  
Carlos Alberto Chiappolini  
Ricardo Chidichimo  
Miguel Ricardo Chiernajowsky  
Jorge Luis Chinetti  
Eduardo Chizzola  
Julián Choque Cahuana  
Alicia Silvia Chuburu  
Alicia Raquel D'ambra  
Carlos Alberto D'ambra  
Julio Cesar D'Elia Pallares  
Luis Tomás D'Arcángelo  
Gerónimo Américo Da Costa  
María Cristina Da Re  
Héctor Jorge Dadin Vesare  
Ricardo Dakuyaku  
Yolanda Mabel Damora  
Alberto Dapozo  
Daniel Alberto Daroqui  
Jorge Arturo Daroqui  
Juan Carlos Daroqui  
Francoise Marie Dauthier  
Carlos Alberto Davit Testa  
Claudio de AchaRubén Mario De 
Angelis  
Alicia Estela De Cicco  
Eugenio Osvaldo de Cristófaro 
Castrillón  
Luis Eduardo De Cristofaro  
Jorge Luis de Iriarte  
Elena de la Cuadra  
Roberto José de la Cuadra  
Carlos Enrique De La Fuente  
Carlos Alberto De Lorenzo  
Eduardo Antonio de Pedro Maldonado  
Pablo Carmelo De Pino  
Silvia de Raffaelli de Peralta  
Victor de Raffaelli  
Cristóbal Augusto Dedionigi  
Raul Arturo Deget  
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Eduardo José Degregori  
María del Cármen del Bosco de Allende  
Julio Arnaldo Del Castillo  
Eduardo José Del Fabro  
Juan Domingo Del Gesso  
Norma Beatriz del Missier  
Néstor José del Río  
Carmen Angélica Delard Cabezas  
Eduardo Alberto Delfino  
Juan Ramón Delgado Vial  
Nora Mabel Delgado  
Carlos María Denis  
Hernando Deria  
Graciela Josefa Devallis de Paulín  
Nestor Devincenti  
Oscar Alfredo Dezorzi  
Miguel Angel Di Pascua  
Jorge Fernando Di Pascuale  
Antonio Adolfo Díaz López  
Enrique Gonzalo Díaz Macias  
Fernando Díaz Cárdenas  
Francisco Rafael Díaz  
Guillermo Eduardo Díaz Nieto  
José Raul Díaz Fernández  
Luis Miguel Díaz Salazar  
Manuel Julio Díaz  
Maria Beatriz Diaz  
Mario Alberto Díaz Moscardo  
Ricardo Mario Díaz  
Santiago Augusto Díaz  
Cristina Diez de Celesia  
Diana Carmen Diez de Rentani  
Jorge Manuel Diez Díaz  
Patricia Dillon de Ciancio  
Luis Vicente Dimattia  
Ricardo Dios  
Mirta Noemí Dithurbide  
Patricia Liliana Dixon  
Valeria Dixon de Garat  
Raul Aurelio Dobelli  
Graciela María Doldan  
Yves Marie Alain Domergue  
Eleonora Dominguez de Cristina  
Miguel Alejandro Domínguez  
Porfirio Domínguez  
Ricardo Eulogio Dominguez Ferreyra  
María Ester Donza de Coria  
Stella Maris Dorado  
Pablo Hermes Dorigo  
P. Carlos Dorñak  
Edmundo Sabino Dossetti Techeira  
Benjamín Isaac Dricas  
Georgina Graciela Droz Estrada  
José Alfredo Duarte  
Eduardo Agustín Duclos  
Aníbal Durand Martinez  
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Rubén Sabino Dure  
Rodolfo Mario Eder  
Marcelo Adolfo Eggers  
Víctor Felipe Egloff  
Cecilia Eguia Benavídez  
Alicia Eguren de Cooke  
Martha Graciela Eiroa Martiniano  
Luis Enrique Eisenschlas  
Américo Eiza  
Luis Enrique Elgueta  
Nilda Elías de Silva  
Rodolfo Daniel Elías  
Claudio Epelbaum  
Lila Epelbaum  
Luis Epelbaum  
Guillermo Angel Ercolano  
Marianne Erize Tisseau  
Margarita Erlich Jaroszewich  
Marta Esain  
Eduardo Gonzalo Escabosa  
Francisco Alfredo Escamez  
Felix Escobar  
Sergio Alberto Escot  
Hernán Gregorio Escudero  
Néstor Julio España  
Enrique Espeche  
Eduardo T. Espinosa Lever  
José Guillermo Espinoza Pesantes  
Mario René Espinoza Barahona  
Carlos María Espoturno  
Alejandro Luis Estigarria  
Manuel Hugo Evequoz Fraga  
Luis Alberto Fabbri  
Luis Mario Fachino  
Pablo Antonio Faimberg  
Susana Falabella de Abdala  
Dora Liliana Falco  
Carlos Agustín Falcon  
María Claudia Falcone  
Roberto Nando Falivene  
José Fernando Fanjul  
Pedro Faramiñán Medina  
Patricia Faraoni  
Daniel Felipe Farias  
Omar Rodolfo Farias  
Beatriz Fariñas de Fornies  
Carlos Guillermo Fassano  
Daniel Omar Favero  
Laura Isabel Feldman  
Ester Felipe  
Anahí Silvia Fernández de Mercader  
Antonia Fernández de Tellez  
Carlos Alfredo Fernández Bastarrica  
Cecilia Fernández Riquelme  
Clara Haydee Fernández  
Eliseo Reynaldo Fernandez  
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Ernesto Fernández Vidal  
Godoberto Luis Fernández  
Hector Hugo Fernández Baños  
Hilda Adriana Fernandez  
Jesús Carlos Alberto Fernández  
José Nicasio Fernández Alvarez  
José Osvaldo Germán Fernández  
Mabel Fernández de Hirschler  
María Cristina Fernández de Pankonin  
Oscar Alfredo Fernández  
Rita Manuela Fernández  
Claudio Arnaldo Ferraris  
Elena Alicia Ferreiro  
José Miguel Ferrero  
Diego Ferreyra Beltrán  
María Irma Ferreira  
Edith Alicia Ferri  
Juan José Ficarra  
Alcira Gabriela Fidalgo Pizarro de 
Valenzuela  
Gloria Susana Figueroa  
Miguel Ángel Figueroa  
Ernesto Mario Filgueira Strien  
Marta de las Mercedes Filgueira Strien  
Nélida Estela Filgueira Strien  
Enrique Carlos Fimiani  
Claudio Marcelo Fink  
Orlando Finsterwald  
Armando Alberto Fioritti  
Carlos Alberto Fiorito  
Jorge Oscar Firmenich  
Claudia Julia Fita Miller  
Jorge Abelardo Flaccavento  
Walter Kenneth Fleury  
Antonio Flores  
Antonio Jorge Flores  
Carlos Jacinto Flores  
Horacio Bernardo Flores  
José Francisco Flores  
Mario Ivar Flores  
Nelson Flores Ugarte  
Pedro Ventura Flores  
Patricia Teresa Flynn  
Gustavo Adolfo Fochi  
Graciela Noemí Folini de Villeres  
Adrián Omar Follonier  
Juan Carlos Follonier  
Mabel Lucía Fontana de La Blunda  
Adolfo Nelson Fontanella  
Romero Faustino Fontenlla  
Alejandro Luis Formica  
Hugo Enrique Fornies  
Daniel Hugo Fortunato  
Jorge Horacio Foulkes  
Humberto Luis Fraccarolli  
Osvaldo Enrique Fraga  
Gustavo Ernesto Fraire  
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Carlos Hugo Franano  
Adriana María Franconetti de Calvo  
Ana María Franconetti  
Eduardo Alvaro Franconetti  
Amalia Rosa Franchelli de Dobelli  
Generosa Fratassi  
Verónica Freier  
Héctor Manuel Freijo  
Tomás Fresneda  
Florencio Ramón Frias  
Pedro Arturo Frías  
Carlos Mario Frigerio  
Luis M. Frutos  
Aída Fuciños Rielo de Galizzi  
Luis Alberto Fuentes  
Julio César Fumarola  
Aníbal Eduardo Gadea  
Emilia Susana Gaggero Pérez de Pujals  
Juan Carlos Gagliano  
Ana María Gago Benedetti  
Patricia Mabel Gaitán  
Crescencio Galañena Hernández  
Julio Isabelino Galarza  
Blanca Eva Galizzi Marzzan  
Juan Alberto Galizzi Machi  
Juan Carlos Galván  
Cristina Galzerano  
Liliana Elida Galletti  
Mario Guillermo Galli  
Stella Maris Gallicchio de Vicario  
Miguel Angel Gallinari  
Carlos Alberto Gambande Ruperti  
Delia Elena Garaguso  
Eduardo Héctor Garat  
Esteban Francisco Garat  
Alejandro Horacio García Martegani  
Antonio Domingo García  
Diana Iris García  
Ernesto García  
Germán Nelson García Carcagno  
Hilda Magdalena García  
Horacio Oscar García Castelu  
Iris Nélida García  
Ileana García Ramos  
María Claudia García Irureta Goyena de 
Gelman  
Nestor Enrique García  
Pablo Alberto García  
Ricardo Bermundo García  
Salvador García Robles  
Victor Hugo García Tosoratto  
Nèlida Leonor Garde de Repetto  
Luis Lorenzo Garello  
Adelina Noemí Gargiulo de Zibaico  
Héctor Hugo Gargiulo  
Arturo Martín Garín  
María Adelia Garín De De Angelis  
135 
 
Ángel Mario Garmendia  
Edgardo Roberto Garnier  
José Luis Aníbal Garoni  
Adriana Gatti Casal  
Gerardo Gatti Antuna  
Eduardo Alberto Garutti  
Teresa Garzón de Rodríguez  
Carlos Oscar Gatto  
Padre Pablo Gazzarri  
Marcelo Ariel Gelman  
Julio Cesar Genoud  
Claudio Martín Gerbilsky  
Mirta Teresa Gerelli  
Luis Román Gerez  
Eduardo Raúl Germano  
Esther Gersberg de Díaz Salazar  
Ángel Salomón Gertel  
Fernando Mario Gertel  
Juan Carlos Gesualdo  
Ricardo Mario Ghigliazza  
Elsa Gider de Krayem  
Carlos Alberto Giglio  
Miguel Máximo Gil  
Douglas Gillie  
Nerio Deryck Gillie  
Helios Gimenez Amuedo  
Silvia Noemí Giménez de Guido  
Tránsito Giménez  
Catalina Ginder  
Héctor Orlando Giordano Cortazzo  
Alfredo Antonio Giorgi  
Horacio Gerardo Girardello Amabilia  
Mario Giribaldi  
Osvaldo Giribaldi  
Rómulo Carlos Giuffra  
Raymundo Gleyzer  
Eugenio Pablo Glovatzky Klimczuk  
Carmen Nelly Godoy de Reczk  
Mario Alberto Godoy  
Marcela Cristina Goeytes  
Julio Goitia  
Franklin Lucio Goizueta Piccioni  
Mónica Liliana Goldberg  
Liliana Ines Goldenberg  
Hugo Alberto Goldsman  
Hugo Ernesto Gomensoro Josman  
Carmen Gómez de Gargiulo  
Daniel Osvaldo Gómez Almeida  
Eva del Jesús Gómez de Agüero  
Gladys Lucía Gómez  
Ileana Esther Gómez Ríos  
María Elena Gómez de Argañaraz  
Ricardo Isidro Gómez  
Gaston Roberto Goncalves  
Jorge Feliberto Gonçalves Busconi  
Alfredo Gonzalez  
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Américo González Villar  
Ana María González Granada  
Carlos Alberto González  
Horacio Mario Gonzalez  
Jesús Angel González  
Jesús Manuel González  
Lidia Edith González Eusebi  
Manuel Angel Gonzalez  
Olga Cristina González  
Pedro Antonio Gonzalez  
Regino Adolfo González Sandaña  
Silvia Amanda Gonzalez de Mora  
Socorro Irene Gonzalez  
Susana Gonzalez de Weisz  
Susana Raquel González  
Víctor Hugo González Lemos  
Silvia Beatriz Goñi de Rossi  
Jorge Israel Gorfinkiel  
Daniel Gorosito  
Alberto Jorge Gorrini  
Francisco Eduardo Gotschlich Cordero  
María Esther Goulecdzian  
Hugo Alberto Goyenetche  
Adela Noemí Goyochea  
José Luis GoyocheaMiguel Ángel 
Gradaschi Camano  
Sara Grande  
Claudio Nicolás Grandi  
Javier Gustavo Grebel Libobich  
Carlos Fernando Gregori  
Néstor Rubén Grill  
Monica Grinspon de Logares  
Daniel José Gropper  
Susana Flora Grynberg  
Lía Mariana Guangiroli de Genoud  
Enrique Gerardo Guastavino  
Carlos Alberto Gudano  
Dante Guede  
Héctor Ricardo Guede  
Eduardo Guerci  
Alicia Margarita Guerrero  
Carlos Francisco Guidet Sánchez  
Raul Alfredo Guido  
Florencia Guillén  
Salvador Jorge Gullo  
Jorge Luis Gurrea  
Manuel Gutiérrez  
Norberto A. Habbeger  
Dagmar Hagelin  
Fernando Hallgarten  
Celia Ester Hanono  
Alejandro Alfredo Hansen  
Luisa Ana Heck De Barciocco  
Hernán Jorge Henríquez  
Juan Marcos Herman  
Eduardo Alberto Hernández  
José Hernández  
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Juan H. Hernandez Zaspe  
Reinaldo Ariel Hernández  
Abel Herrera  
Claudio Daniel Herrera  
Leonor Ines Herrera  
Juan Domingo Herrera  
Máximo Fernando Herrera  
Miguel Gerónimo Herrera  
Nestor Ubaldo Herrera  
Roberto Justo Herrera  
Rosa Dalia Herrera  
Jose Luis Herrero  
Jairo de Jesús Herrón Fernández  
Amelia Higa  
Juan Carlos Higa  
Andrés Ernesto Hirschler  
Carlos Alberto Hobert  
Oscar Luis Hodola  
Oscar Omar Hofer  
Victor Hugo Hofer  
Alberto Hojman Trainoff  
Miguel Angel Horton  
Julia Natividad Huarque  
Francisco Host Venturi  
Susana Noemi Huarte Martinez  
Patricia Huchansky de Simó  
Norma Susana Huder de Prado  
Oscar Lautaro Hueravilo  
Saturnino Vicente Ianni  
Luis Armando Ibañez  
Luisa Ana Ibañez  
Nancy Norma Ibáñez  
Roberto Aníbal Ibánez  
Miguel Ibarbe  
Justo César Ibarguren  
Emilio Antonio Ibarra  
Raúl Alberto Iglesias  
Bernardo Ignace  
Ignacio Ikonikoff  
Armando Imas  
Daniel Alfredo Inama  
Adolfo Luis Infante Allende  
Jorge Rosalino Infantino  
Liliana Iorio  
Silvia Mabel Isabella Valenzi  
José Luis Isla  
Ismael Alfredo Islas Ibarra  
Martín Alfredo Islas  
Teresa Israel  
Claudia Istueta  
Alexis Jaccard Siegler  
Ricardo Ramón Jacobe  
María Carolina Jacue  
Susana Rosa Jacué  
Angel Gustavo Jaeggi Díaz  
Noemi Jansenson  
138 
 
Luis Adolfo Jaramillo  
María del Carmen Jaramillo  
Máximo Eduardo Jaroslavsky  
Rolando Hugo Jeckel  
Maurice Jeger  
Alejandro E. Jerez Bordeau  
Victor Jerez  
Ramona Berta Jimenez  
Juan Carlos Jordán Vercellone  
Esteban Bonifacio Juarez  
Máximo José Juárez  
Telba Juárez  
Sergio León Kacs  
Elena Kalaidjian  
Julio Kalejman  
Cecilio Kamenetzky  
Elisabeth Kasemann  
Marlene Katherine Kegler Krug  
Gloria Kehoe Wilson  
Jorge Oscar Kofman Zeigner  
Carlos Antonio Koks  
Alfredo Arturo Kölliker Frers  
Eduardo Sergio Korsunsky  
José Kreplak  
Irene Krichmar de Butrón  
Jorge Arturo Kuhn  
Pedro La Blunda  
Jorge José La Cioppa  
Carlos Cayetano La Rosa  
Nora Susana La Spina  
Carlos Alberto Labolita  
Miguel Angel Labrador Pérez  
Gustavo Horacio Lafleur  
Monica Silvia Lafuente  
Teresita Leoni Lagger De Marenda  
Alberto Carlos Lago  
Fernando Juan Lagos  
Oscar Alejandro Lagrotta  
Leonor Rosario Landaburu de Catnich  
Mabel Landi  
Martín Ramón Landin  
Ana Maria Lanzillotto de Menna  
Maria Cristina Lanzillotto de Santillan  
Guillermo Antonio Lara  
Electra Irene Lareu Vieira de 
Belaustegui  
Juan José Laso  
Omar Enrique Lauria  
Enzo Lauroni  
Hugo Anibal Lavalle  
Patricia Emilia Lazzeri  
Beatriz Le Fur  
Heriberto del Carmen Leal Sanhueza  
Nestor José Ledesma Yocca  
Alberto Agapito Ledo  
José Luis Leduc  
Hilda Leikis de Alvarez  
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Eduardo Raúl Leguizamón  
Miguel Angel Leguizamon  
Carlos Alberto Leinbock  
Adán Rodolfo Leiva  
María Delia Leiva  
Augusto María Lenzi  
Susana Leonardi de Nievas  
Roberto Omar Leonardo  
Lucio Leone  
Pablo Armando Lepiscopo  
Ana María Lescano  
Arturo Alberto Lescano  
Luis Alejandro Lescano  
María Amelia Lesgart  
Rogelio Anibal Lesgart  
Jorge Claudio Lewi  
Néstor Abel Leyes  
Julio Roberto Liano  
Susana Libedinsky  
Manuel Liberoff  
Daniel Eduardo Linares Luque  
Oscar Andrés Liñeira  
Patricio Guillermo Lobo  
Claudio Logares  
Ricardo Lois  
María Cristina Lonardi de Cravello  
Adrián Sergio López  
Celia López Alonso  
Carlos López  
Eduardo Néstor López  
Felix Daniel López Saracco  
Héctor Enrique López  
Héctor María López Matheu  
José Manuel Lopez  
Leopoldo Omar López  
María Cristina López Guerra de 
Belaustegui  
Mirta Graciela Lopez  
Mirtha Gladys López  
Néstor López Fornes  
Ramón Francisco López  
Ricardo Ernesto López  
Roberto Raúl López  
Rosa Ceferina López  
Urbano López Fernández  
Carlos Alberto Lorenzo  
Clara Josefina Lorenzo Tillard  
María Esther Lorusso Lammle  
Alberto Isidro Losada  
Juan Carlos Losoviz  
Daniel Roberto Loto Zurita  
José Teodoro Loto Zurita  
Roberto Mario Loyola  
Carlos Alberto Lucantis  
Rodolfo Guillermo Luccioni  
Federico Gerardo Ludden Lehmann  
Cesar Lugones  
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Hugo Julián Luna  
Ignacio Jesús Luna Sánchez  
Juan Manuel Luna  
Olga Luteral  
Raúl Alfredo Llanes  
Ramón Antonio Llanivelli Rojas  
Carlos Llerena Rosas  
Sebastián María Llorens  
Noemí Beatriz Macedo  
Celia Sara Machado de Rébori  
Esteban Abundio Machado  
Modesto Humberto Machado  
Luis Norberto Macor  
Graciela Macrenzic  
Jorge Angel Machuca Muñoz  
Armando Madariaga Antolin  
Patricia Rossana Maddalena de Romero  
Juan Pablo Maestre  
Walter Ramón Magallanes  
Carlos Horacio Magariños  
Horacio Domingo Maggio  
Miguel Ángel Magnarelli  
María Cecilia Magnet Ferrero de 
Tamburini  
Roberto Maimone  
Dominga Antonia Maisano de Loyola  
Jorge Eduardo Malberti Risso  
Hugo Armando MalozowskiAlicia 
Mallea  
Olga Yolanda Mamani  
Beatriz Ofelia Mancebo  
José Manfredi  
Juan Santiago Mangini  
Alejandro Pedro Mansilla  
Liliana Mansilla  
Ricardo Hugo Manuele  
Daniel Aldo Manzotti  
Adriana Claudia Marandet Bobes de 
Ruival  
Carlos Ruben Marcón  
Américo Jorge Marchetti  
Angel Dante Marchi Bena  
Elizabeth Patricia Marcuzzo  
Nora Beatriz Mardikiand de Cabello  
Juan Carlos Mardikiand  
Félix Oscar Marelli  
Cecilia Marfortt de Trod  
Arturo José Margaride Goyos  
Hector Marghetich  
Adolfo Margutti  
Daniel Enrique Mariani  
Francisco Eduardo Marín  
Juan Carlos Marín  
Juan Marinaro  
Eduardo Aníbal Marino  
Enrique Julio Marino  
Andrés Marizcurrena  
Juan Patricio Maroni  
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María Beatriz Maroni  
Arturo Gustavo Marotta  
Liliana Alicia Marchetti de Araujo  
Irma Beatriz Márquez  
Luis Ernesto Marquez  
Cristina Lucía Marrocco  
Susana Marrocco  
Julio Antonio Martin  
Melita Ruth Martín Carrasco  
Laura Susana Martinelli de Oliva  
Adriana Martinez Perez  
Alfredo Guillermo Martínez  
Ana María Martínez  
Atilio Cesar Martínez Lagrava  
César Carlos Martínez  
Eduardo Alberto Martínez  
Elsa Martínez de Ramírez  
Héctor Luis Martínez  
Horacio Martinez  
Jorge Alberto Martínez Abelleida  
José Agustín Martínez Agüero  
José Alberto Martínez  
José Mario Martínez Suárez  
María Luisa Martínez de González  
Rocío Ángela Martínez  
Segundo Luis Martínez  
Susana M. Martinez Wasserman  
Ubaldo Nieves Martínez  
Bibiana Martini de Adur  
Juan Francisco Martinis  
Pedro Oscar Martucci  
Heraldo Juan Marucco  
Leonor Gertrudis Marx Pinkus  
Monica Masri  
Alejandro Daniel Masriera  
Ricardo Alberto Massa  
Hugo Massucco  
Martino Mastinu  
Marta Zelmira Mastrogiácomo  
Alejandro Ángel Mastrogiovanni  
Abel Héctor Mateu Gallardo  
Raúl Humberto Mattarollo Olmos  
Roberto Jorge Matthews  
María Cristina Mattioli de Torterau  
Orlando Maturano  
Nora Luisa Maurer  
María Angélica Mayor de Rosales  
Vicente Jorge Mazzitelli  
Winston César Mazzuchi Frantches  
César Alfredo Mecking  
María Graciela Médici  
Angel Alfonso Medina Gutiérrez  
Gustavo Medina Ortiz  
Oscar Alberto Medina  
Roberto Luis Medina  
Susana B. Medina de Bertholet  
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Hugo Alberto Megna  
Delfor Manuel Meira  
Norma Hilda Melani  
Nebio Ariel Melo Cuesta  
Graciela Mellibovsky Saidler  
Helvio Alcides Mellino  
Antonio Mendez  
Jorge Omar Méndez Trejo  
José Delineo Mendez  
Orlando Reneé Mendez  
Pedro Alberto Mendez  
Carlos María MendozaJorge Mendoza 
Calderón  
Mario Eduardo Menéndez  
Domingo Menna  
Eduardo Ezequiel Merajver Bercovich  
Mario Miguel Mercader  
Adela Del Carmen Mercado  
Gladys del Valle Mercado Paez  
María del Valle Mercado  
Manuel Antonio Mercado  
María Leonor Mercuri Monzó  
Rodolfo Antonio Merediz  
Dante Aníbal Merolla  
Fernando Salvador Merolla  
Alicia Norma Meroño  
Diego Eugenio Merzbacher Schorr  
Rubén "Tito" Messiez  
Raúl Eugenio Metz  
Asunción del Carmen Meza  
Sabino Meza  
Alberto Daniel Miani  
Daniel Bernardo Micucci  
Viviana Micucci  
Mónica María Candelaria Mignone  
Guillermo Augusto Miguel  
Silvia Emilia Miguens  
Nilda Miguez de Molina  
Pablo Antonio Miguez  
Rosa Leonor Millan de Sosa  
Cecilia Laura Minervini  
Francisco Natalio Mirabelli  
Haydee Lucía Miralles  
Luis Ernesto Miramon  
Oscar Miranda  
Raúl Miranda  
Susana Elvira Miranda  
Mirta Misetich  
Amalia Clotilde Moavro  
Adolfo Rubén Moldavsky  
Marcela Esther Molfino  
Dardo Francisco Molina  
Domingo Calisto Molina Moya  
Jesús Juan Carlos Molina  
Jorge Carlos Molina  
Jorge Luis Molina  
José María Molina  
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Raúl Mateo Molina  
Guillermo Mario Molinillo  
Liliana Edith Molteni  
Luis Carlos Mónaco  
José Manuel Monteagudo  
Mariano Carlos Montequín  
Roald Montes  
Stella Maris Montesano de Ogando  
Leonardo Amador Montesinos  
María Virginia Monzani de Andisco  
Edy Luis Santiago Monzon Novena  
José Reinaldo Monzón  
Juan Carlos Mora  
Alejandro Manuel Morales  
José Ramon Morales  
José Silvano Morales  
Julio César Morales  
Luis Alberto Morales  
Mercedes del Valle Morales  
Mónica Morán  
Ariel Eduardo Morandi  
Héctor Victorio Morandi  
Susana Carmen Moras  
María Rosa Moreira de Fernández  
Fidela Morel  
Pedro Crisólogo Morel  
Carlos Alberto Moreno  
Graciela Moreno  
Jorge Horacio Moreno  
Nélida Noemi Moreno de Goyochea  
Pedro Francisco Moresi  
Ester Moretti  
Roberto Morillo  
Luis Rodolfo Morina Jung  
Miguel Angel Morini  
Norberto Julio Morresi  
Raúl Oscar Mortola  
Jorge Teodoro Mosqueda  
Antonio Juan Mosquera  
Rubén Hugo Motta  
Toni Agatina Motta  
Jorge Horacio Moura  
Eusebio Jesús Mouriño González  
Miguel Ángel Moussegne  
Ricardo Alfredo Moya  
Alfredo Moyano Santander  
Eduardo Horacio Moyano  
Ana María Mrad de Medina  
María Josefina Mujica  
Alberto José Munarriz  
Luis Munitis Orione  
Agustina Muñiz Paz  
Diego Muñiz Barreto  
María Dolores Muniz Etchemoun  
Santa Muratore de Lepere  
Eduardo Jorge Murillo Jeansen  
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Rosa Angélica Murno  
Gladys Noemí Musante  
Julio Argentino Mussi  
Pablo Daniel Musso  
Gregorio Nachman  
Pedro Luis Nadal García  
Carmen Liliana Nahs de Bruzzone  
Jorge Miguel Name  
Claudio Norberto Nardini  
Dina Nardone  
Cristina Navajas de Santucho  
Eduardo Navajas Jauregui  
María Victoria Navajas Jáuregui  
Julio Alfredo Navarro  
Alicia Irene Naymark Gabe  
Paulo Alberto Nazaro  
Raquel Negro  
Beatriz Haydee Neuhaus de Martinis  
Adriana Silvia Nieto  
Juan Mateo Nieto  
Marcos Eugenio Nieva  
Oscar Rene Nieva  
Mario Alberto Nivoli  
Alberto Teodoro Noailles  
Graciela Mirta Nogueira de Ricny  
María de Lourdes Noia de Mezzadra  
Fernando Pablo Nolasco  
Rosa Eugenia Novillo Corvalan  
Juan Angel Nughes  
Felix Edgardo Núñez  
Roque Miguel Nuñez  
Roque Nuñez  
Victor Hugo Nuñez  
Rosa Adela Oberti De Soriano  
Sauro Antonio Obreque  
Claudio Melquiades Ocampo Alonso  
Carlos Abel Ocerin Fernández  
Beatriz Marta Oesterheld  
Diana Irene Oesterheld  
Estela Inés Oesterheld  
Héctor Germán Oesterheld  
Marina Oesterheld  
Emilio Horacio Ogando  
Gustavo Ogando Gibello  
Jorge Oscar Ogando  
Carlos Alberto Oliva  
Carlos Delfin Oliva  
Leticia M. Oliva de Méndez  
Rafael Olivera  
Raúl Pedro Olivera Cancela  
Roberto Héctor Olivestre  
Gloria Martha Olivieri Ramos  
Gustavo Gabriel Olmedo  
José Horacio Olmedo  
Gary Nelson Olmos Guzmán  
Chris Anna Olson Latta  
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Inés Ollero  
Juan Carlos Ontivero  
Eduardo O'Neill  
Alicia Nora Oppenheimer  
Miguel Iván Orellana Castro  
Alberto Marcelo Oro  
Daniel Franciso Orozco  
Rodolfo Ortega Peña  
Blanca Esther Ortiz de Murua  
Ramón Antonio Ortiz  
Rodolfo Ortiz Escobar  
Jorge Eduardo Oshiro  
Oscar Oshiro  
Pablo Osorio  
Susana Elena Ossola de Urrua  
David Manuel Ostrowiecki  
Lidia Neptalis Otarola  
María Cristina Otarola  
Alfredo Outon  
Héctor Rafael Ovejero  
Victor Humberto Ovejero  
Eduardo Oviedo Morales  
Raúl Enrique Oxley  
Mario Daniel Oyarzabal  
Roberto Simón Ozorio  
Coca Pablo  
Víctor Hugo Paciaroni  
Vicente Padín Pillado  
Alberto Paira (M)  
José Serapio Palacio  
Rubén Amadeo Palazzesi  
Norberto Hugo Palermo  
Hugo Alberto Palmeiro  
Mario Oscar Paluci  
Osvaldo C. Paludi  
Antonio Pandolfino  
Julio Enzo Panebianco Labbe  
Enrique Pankonin Abis  
Jorge Edgardo Papadopulos  
Jorge Emilio Papetti  
Luján Susana Papic  
Juan Carlos Parada  
Adolfo Paredes  
José Alfredo Pareja Galviati  
Hugo Alberto Parente  
Alberto José Pargament  
Silvina Mónica Parodi de Orozco  
Patricia Elida Parreira  
Silvana Parrile de Salinas  
Otilio Julio Pascua  
Gustavo Pasik  
Aida Alicia Pastarini  
Alberto Manuel Pastor  
Héctor Mario Patino  
Costanza Paz  
Raúl Santiago Paz  
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Enrique Carlos Pecoraro  
Luis Hugo Pechien Navarro  
Josefina Teresa Pedemonte de Ruiz 
Vargas  
Horacio Vital Pedraza  
Susana Elena Pedrini  
Eugenio Roberto Pedrozo  
Juan Pegoraro  
Susana Beatriz Pegoraro  
Justo José Pelozo  
Juan Carlos Pellegrini Druetto  
Luis Roberto Pender  
Hugo Reinaldo Penino  
Isidoro Peña  
Jesus Peña  
Juan Roger Peña Saenz  
Eustaquio Peralta  
Luis Alfredo Peralta  
María Ester Peralta de Zalazar  
Oscar Alcides Peralta  
Silvia Peralta de Ferreyra  
Berta Perassi  
María del Carmen Percivati Franco  
Ana María Rita Perdighe  
María Luisa Peredo  
Stella Maris Pereiro de Gonzalez  
Liliana Carmen Pereyra  
Alicia Isabel Pérez de Astorga  
Ana María del Carmen Pérez  
Benjamín Pérez  
Carlos Alberto Pérez  
Carlos Alberto Pérez  
Eugenio Carlos Pérez  
Félix Jorge Pérez  
Jorge Eduardo Pérez Brancatto  
Jorge Enrique Pérez Catán  
Juan Carlos Pérez  
Julio Enrique Pérez Andrade  
Marcos Antonio Pérez  
Ricardo Adrián Pérez  
Walter Teófilo Pérez Loza  
Graciela Pernas  
Jorge Luis Perón  
Guillermo Perot  
Rafael Andrés Perrota  
Susana Pertierra  
José Carlos Perucca Piacenzi  
María Elena Peter de Fioritti  
Nilda Graciela Peters  
Angel Julio Petraglia  
Roberto Francisco Piasecki  
Félix Eduardo Picardi  
Aurora Valentina Pico de Garbarino  
María Luisa Piedra Gómez  
Ana María Piffaretti  
Alejandro Víctor Pina  
Miguel Angel Pincheira  
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Ángel Mario Pinedo  
Lucia Elena Pinto  
José Oscar Pintos  
Mónica Susana Pinus de Binstok  
Cora María Pioli  
Jorge Luis Piotti  
Elba Beatriz Pirola de Rivelli  
Julio Luis Piriz  
Liliana Pizá de Paira  
Cristina Isabel Planas  
Osvaldo Plaul  
Juan Domingo Plaza  
Julio Poce  
Ricardo Poce  
Celicia Podolsky de Bronzel  
Horacio Norberto Poggio  
Miguel Alfredo Poinsteau Neuman  
Héctor Osvaldo Polito  
Victor José Polti  
Alberto Santos Ponce  
Ana Maria Ponce  
Francisco Gregorio Ponce  
Griselda del Huerto Ponce  
Mercedes Gerardo Ponce  
Sara Isabel Ponti  
Gladys del Valle Porcel de Puggioni  
Ada Victoria Porta  
Miguel Ángel Porta  
Segundo Oscar Porven  
Adriana Silvia Prack  
Angel Alberto Prado  
Sergio Guillermo Prado  
José Carlos Prat  
Raúl Horacio Premat  
Armando Prieto Alonso  
Salvatore Privitera  
Alberto Armando Pruneda  
Nicolás Puca  
Jorge Alberto Pucci Souza  
Norma Lidia Puerto de Risso  
Juan Daniel Puigjané  
Luis Enrique Pujals  
Jorge Gabriel Pujol  
Graciela Pujol de Olmedo  
Alicia Mabel Queiro  
Washington D Queiro Uzal  
Graciela Irene Quesada  
Carlos Quieto  
Roberto Quieto  
María Ester Quignard  
Silvia Mónica Quintela  
Jorge Alberto Quinterno Sabatini  
Jorge Alberto Quinteros  
Pedro Ernesto Quiñones  
Julio César Quiroga  
María Josefina Quiroga de Murúa  
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Enrique Raab  
Orlando Luis Raffo  
Miguel Ragone  
Rodolfo Armando M. Ragucci  
Jorge Daniel Raies  
Jaime Abraham Ramallo Chavez  
Adolfo Agustín Ramírez  
Alicia Beatriz Ramirez Abella de 
Cassataro  
Bárbara Ramírez Plante  
Elba Leonor Ramírez Abella de 
Baibiene  
Héctor Eduardo Ramírez  
Hernán Ramírez  
Oscar Aníbal Ramírez  
Rosario Victoria Ramírez de Vega  
Eduardo Ramos Mejía  
José Eduardo Ramos  
Juan Carlos Ramos López  
Noemí Concepción Ramos  
Susana Beatríz Ramos de Bidegorry  
Horacio Rapaport  
Osvaldo Raúl Ravasi Deganutti  
Ricardo Arturo Rave  
María Teresa Ravignani  
Augusto Rebagliati  
Alfredo Mauricio Reboredo  
Humberto Antonio Rébori  
Jorge Lucio Rébori  
Beatriz Recchia  
Juan Enrique Reggiardo  
Yolanda Dolores Reguera Brites  
Esteban Alfredo Reimer  
Eduardo Lucio Renedo  
Alejandra Magdalena Renou  
Luis Alberto Rentani  
Lidia Elena Renzi  
Hebe Nelly Repetto  
Maria del Carmen Repetto  
Nestor Omar Repetto  
Raúl Repetto  
Eduardo Requena  
Liliana Beatriz Retegui  
Mario Horacio Revoledo  
Lucila Adela Révora  
Eduardo Raimundo Rey  
Manuel Zoilo Reyes  
Hugo Javier Rezeck  
Ariel Ricetti  
Guillermo Eduardo Ricny  
Carlos Alberto Rincón Barber  
Luis Anselmo Ricciardino  
Miguel Angel Río Casas  
Jaime Nury Riquelme Gangas  
Daniel Jorge Risso  
Guillermo Daniel Ritter Rosenfeld  
José Filemón Rivadeneira  
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Miguel Angel Rivadeneira  
Roberto Abel Rivelli  
Carlos. A Rizzo Molina  
Oscar Alberto Rizzo  
Emilio Roa Espinoza  
Gaston Jose Robles Toledo  
Julio Secundino Robles  
Rubén Francisco Roca  
Antonio Eulogio Rocha  
Néstor Rodas  
Abraham Eulogio Rodríguez  
Alicia Rodriguez Saenz de Bourg  
Ambrosio Abraham Rodriguez  
Carlos Esteban Rodríguez  
Eduardo José Rodríguez  
Gustavo Adrián Rodríguez  
Hector Hugo Rodriguez  
José Luis Rodríguez Diéguez  
Juan Antonio Rodríguez  
Luis Cristobal Rodriguez Burgos  
Marcelo Mario Rodríguez  
Mario Germán Rodríguez  
Miguel Agustin Rodriguez Scagliotti  
Nora Rodríguez Jurado de Olivera  
Ruben Desiderio Rodriguez  
Carlos Maria Roggerone  
Jorge Mario Roitman  
Blas Mario Rojas  
Tristán Omar Roldán  
Norberto Miguel Rollán Llull  
Carmen Candela Román de Iglesias  
Nicolas Miguel Angel Roman  
Benito Vicente Romano  
Humberto Nicolas Romano  
Daniel Oscar Romanutti  
Alfredo Romay Méndez  
Graciela Alicia Romero de Metz  
Jorge Luis Romero  
Laura Gladis Romero  
Mario Osvaldo Romero  
Orlando Diego Romero  
Pedro Antonio Romero  
Roberto Julio Romero  
Toribia Romero de Morales  
Ana María Rómoli  
Rodolfo Alberto Ron  
Jorge Osvaldo Rondoletto Cenador  
Pedro Rondoletto  
Silvia Margarita Rondoletto Cenador  
Carlos Rafael Rosales  
Francisco Prospero Rosales  
Walter Claudio Rosenfeld  
Raul Alberto Rossini  
Néstor Adolfo Rovegno  
Ana Rubel de Castro  
Horacio Alberto Rubino  
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Raquel Rubino  
Pablo Gustavo Rueda  
Jorge Luis Ruffa  
Eduardo Edelmiro Ruival  
Fidelino Werter Ruiz  
Raul Ricardo Ruiz  
Ubaldo Fidel Ruiz  
Daniel Lázaro Rus  
Cristobal Constantino Russo  
Graciela Rutilo Artes  
Julio César Saavedra  
Guido Arturo Saavedra Inostroza  
Maria del Carmen Sabino  
Nidia Beatriz Saens  
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